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Abstract
Low-Rate Wireless Personal Area Networks are a prevalent solution for
communication among embedded devices. ZigBee is a leading network protocol stack
based on the low-rate IEEE 802.15.4 standard that operates smart utility meters,
residential and commercial building automation, and heath care networks. Such networks
are essential, but low-rate, low-cost hardware is challenging to protect because end
devices have tight limitations on hardware cost, memory use, and power consumption.
KillerBee is a python-based framework for attacking ZigBee and other 802.15.4 networks
that makes traffic eavesdropping, packet replay, and denial of service attacks
straightforward to conduct. Recent works investigate software-defined radios as an even
more versatile attack platform. Software defined radios can operate with greater flexibility
and at greater transmit power than traditional network hardware. Software-defined radios
also enable novel physical-layer attacks including reflexive jamming and synchronization
header manipulation that are not possible with traditional hardware.
This research implements a replay attack against a ZigBee device using a software
defined radio. Replay attacks consist of an attacker recording legitimate traffic on a
network and then replaying that traffic at will to cause malicious effects. Replay attacks
can be very disruptive to operational systems, from turning valves in industrial controls
systems to disarming door locks. Specifically, how software-defined radios can extend the
effective attack range far beyond what is possible with hardware currently utilized by
KillerBee is investigated.
A software defined radio is tested with both directed and omnidirectional antennas
and the effective attack range is compared to that of a USB radio. Tests are conducted both
line-of-sight outdoors and through interior walls. The replay attack is implemented with
iv
beacon request frames. Legitimate beacon request frames are prerecorded with the
software defined radio, and at a later time, replayed against a target device. Results
demonstrate that, in addition to being a more versatile attack platform, software-defined
radios extend the effective wireless attack range beyond that of fixed KillerBee hardware.
v
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COMPARISON OF ZIGBEE REPLAY ATTACKS USING A
UNIVERSAL SOFTWARE RADIO PERIPHERAL AND USB RADIO
I. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
As the world becomes increasingly interconnected, low power communication
solutions are necessary for embedded devices. One such solution is the ZigBee protocol.
ZigBee is commonly used in home automation, health care networks, and the smart
energy grid. However, with demands for low power consumption being paramount,
security concerns are often secondary. Some developer guides discourage the use of
security. A recent study shows several in-use ZigBee networks operate in an insecure
state [RMSB13]. software defined radio (SDR) is a field of study of increasing interest; it
allows for one set of hardware to switch between multiple implementations. This could
allow for a single platform to test the attack surface of multiple protocols.
1.2 Research Goals
The goal of this research is to determine the viability of using a SDR, specifically
National Instrument’s $1,700 USRP, as a tool for exploring and attacking ZigBee and
other 802.15.4 networks [ER14]. By looking at replay attacks, this research intends to
demonstrate range improvements of SDR over 802.15.4 USB radios. This research
investigates the feasibility of the USRP as a tool for exploring and attacking ZigBee and
other 802.15.4 networks. Performance is evaluated by comparing success rates and power.
The Atmel Atmel RZ Raven USB stick (RZUSBSTICK), a $40 802.15.4 USB radio, is
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chosen because it is the recommended hardware for use with the KillerBee attack
suite [CWL10]. Due to superior transmission power, the USRP is expected to achieve a
higher success rate at greater distances than the RZUSBSTICK.
1.3 Thesis Layout
This chapter introduced the motivation and goals of this thesis. Chapter 2 gives
background on ZigBee, USRP, and GNU Radio as well as related work in ZigBee security
and ZigBee using GNU Radio. Chapter 3 details the experiment conducted during this
thesis. Chapter 4 discusses and analyzes the results of the experiments detailed in
Chapter 3. Chapter 5 presents conclusions and guidance for future work.
2
II. Background
This chapter discusses the ZigBee protocol and the threats against it. Section 2.1
details the ZigBee protocol and how it works. Section 2.2 discusses current attacks against
ZigBee. Section 2.3 discusses SDR and attempts to implement ZigBee on the USRP.
2.1 ZigBee
2.1.1 ZigBee Functionality.
ZigBee is a wireless protocol based on IEEE standard 802.15.4. The standard is
intended for the creation of low-rate wireless personal area networks (LR-WPANs) for
devices that require low complexity, cost, power consumption, and connectivity (e.g.,
embedded devices) [80211]. The ZigBee protocol itself is maintained by a non-profit
association of businesses, universities, and government agencies known as the ZigBee
Alliance [Zig13].
2.1.1.1 Radio Frequency Bands.
IEEE standard 802.15.4 defines several sets of radio frequency bands to
communicate. The main frequency range used is 2400-2483.5 MHz; however, 868-868.6
MHZ and 902-928 MHz are also defined in the 802.15.4 standard. In China, 314-316
MHz, 430-434 MHz, and 779-787 MHz ranges are allowed while, in Japan, the 950-956
MHz band is defined for use in 802.15.4 networks [80211].
As shown in Figure 2.1, networks using the 802.15.4 standard operate over 27
possible channels. The 868 MHz frequency band only contains channel 0. The 902 MHz
band contains 10 channels, numbered 1 to 10. The 2400 MHz frequency band contains 16
channels, numbered 11 through 26 [80211]. ZigBee specifically operates in the 2400 MHz
band, using channels 11 through 26. This is due to a lack of speed in the sub 1 GHz
bands [Gis08].
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Figure 2.1: The 802.15.4 Frequency Bands [LLC14]
2.1.2 Current Uses.
The ZigBee Alliance offers three different specifications: ZigBee, ZigBee IP, and
ZigBee Radio Frequency for Consumer Electronics (RF4CE). The core ZigBee
specification is further split into two feature sets, ZigBee and ZigBee PRO. The main
difference between the two is the number of devices a network can include. Also, ZigBee
PRO includes some optimizations over ZigBee such as improved battery-free support and
traffic load capacity. ZigBee PRO is the more popular feature set due to increased
functionality [Zig13]. The ZigBee IP specification is an open standard Internet protocol
version six (IPv6) based mesh networking solution. It is designed to support the ZigBee
Smart Energy standard, and is intended to provide seamless Internet connectivity to
low-power devices.
The ZigBee RF4CE specification is designed to be simpler than the core ZigBee
standard; it is used in simple two-way device connections that do not need a full mesh
network, thus requiring less resources and reducing implementation costs [Zig13].
The ZigBee Alliance also offers ten standards, each for a specific use of ZigBee.
They include ZigBee Building Automation, Remote Control, Smart Energy, Smart Energy
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Profile 2, Health Care, Home Automation, Input Device, Light Link, Retail Services,
Telecom Services, and Network Devices. ZigBee devices can be used in applications
ranging from light emitting diode (LED) and light control to communication between
health care devices and the Smart Energy Grid [Zig13].
2.1.3 Topologies.
ZigBee devices are categorized into two different types: full-fuction devices (FFDs)
and reduced-function devices (RFDs). The difference between an FFD and an RFD is that
the FFD can act as a coordinator and communicate with any node within the network.
RFDs can only communicate with a single FFD [Gis08]. A coordinator is a device that
provides synchronization to other devices in the LR-WPAN. While a LR-WPAN can have
multiple coordinators, there is a single personal area network (PAN) coordinator that
controls the network. The PAN coordinator is responsible for network and security
management, and each 802.15.4 network must have at least one PAN coordinator [80211].
ZigBee devices can be configured to communicate in either a star network or a
peer-to-peer network. In a star network, peripheral devices can only communicate with
the PAN coordinator. In a peer-to-peer network, FFDs can talk to any other FFDs within
range, while RFDs can only talk to the FFD with which they are associated. Multiple
peer-to-peer networks can be joined together to form mesh networks [80211].
2.1.4 ZigBee Stack.
As shown in Figure 2.2, ZigBee contains four layers in its stack. The 802.15.4
standard defines the physical layer (PHY) and medium access control (MAC)
layers [80211]. The ZigBee Alliance, a collection of companies that implement the
ZigBee stack, define the network (NWK) and application (APL) layers. Within the APL
layer, the ZigBee Alliance further defines an application support sublayer (APS), a ZigBee
Device Object (ZDO), and application objects.
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Figure 2.2: The ZigBee Stack. Adapted from [Gis08]
2.1.4.1 Physical (PHY).
The PHY layer consists of devices’ radio frequency (RF) transceivers. The PHY
layer provides services such as activation and deactivation of the radio transceiver, channel
selection, clear channel assessment, and transmitting and receiving packets [80211].
2.1.4.2 Medium Access Control (MAC).
The MAC layer provides several features. They include beacon management,
channel access, frame validation, acknowledged frame delivery, association, and
disassociation [80211]. However, ZigBee does not use all of the services offered by the
IEEE 802.15.4 standard. For example, it does not use guaranteed time slots. This allows
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ZigBee to be more flexible and less resource intensive depending on each vendor’s
implementation [Gis08].
2.1.4.3 Network (NWK).
The NWK layer is the lowest layer defined solely by the ZigBee protocol. Networks
are formed by ZigBee Coordinators at the NWK layer. For a ZigBee Coordinator to form
a network, it first must determine if there are other networks in range. This is
accomplished with a beacon request frame. Any ZigBee nodes within range must reply
with a beacon frame. The ZigBee Coordinator can then decide whether it wants to join an
existing network, or create a new one. The parameters of the network it wants to create
includes the channel(s), PAN ID, and security level. The beacon request frame also
ensures that a new network will not be set up with a conflicting PAN ID [Gis08].
2.1.4.4 Application Layer (APL).
The APL is split into four parts: the application support sublayer (APS), a ZigBee
Device Object (ZDO), application objects, and security services. The APS acts as an
interface between device applications and ZigBee. The APS is the layer that offers
end-to-end acknowledgment of data. The APS allows one ZigBee device to bind to
another. This is what denotes a connection [Gis08]. The APL also includes the security
services inherent in ZigBee as discussed in Section 2.1.5 [Gis08].
The ZDO is the part of the APL that keeps track of the state of the ZigBee device. It
also interacts with the NWK layer. It decides when to form, join, or leave a network. It
acts as an application interface between the NWK layer and the APL [Gis08].
2.1.5 ZigBee Security.
2.1.5.1 Security Modes.
The ZigBee PRO feature set has two security modes, high security and standard
security; whereas the ZigBee feature set only has standard security mode. The difference
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between the two security modes involves key management and distribution. Standard
security is designed for use in residential situations. Standard security allows in-band
unsecured key transport [YNN08]. That is, in standard security mode network keys are
allowed to traverse the network during rekeying [VHnA+13]. In high security mode, a list
of all keys in use on the network is maintained and keys are not allowed to traverse the
network unencrypted [YNN08].
2.1.5.2 Trust Center.
The main concept of ZigBee security revolves around the Trust Center (TC). The TC
is an application that all devices in the network trust. It is set up by the PAN coordinator
and, by default, runs on the PAN coordinator. In standard security mode, the TC controls
the network key and network admittance policies. In high security mode, the TC must in
addition maintain a list of all devices in the network and all relevant keys [YNN08].
2.1.5.3 Keys.
ZigBee defines three keys: Link Key, Network Key, and Master Key. A Link Key is
shared between two devices that want to communicate. A Network Key is shared by all
devices on a network and is used in broadcast communications. A Master Key is shared
by a device and the TC for key establishment and rekeying purposes. A Master Key is also
sometimes called a Transport Key [YNN08] [DT10].
2.1.5.4 Security Levels.
ZigBee uses Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to optionally secure
communications with a security mechanism known as counter with CBC-MAC (CCM).
The 802.15.4 standard defines eight security levels that are used in ZigBee. Yang lists the
various security levels as shown in Table 2.1. Each security level has varying levels of
data confidentiality and data authenticity. The first four offer no confidentiality, while the
others offer 128 bit AES encryption. Six levels offer a Message Integrity Code (MIC) of
8
varying length to ensure message integrity. The first security level offers no security
whatsoever [Yan09].
Table 2.1: Security Levels Available to the MAC, NWK, and APS Layers [Yan09]
Security Level
Identifier
Security Level
Sub-field
Security Suite Security Attributes Data Encryption
Frame Integrity
(length M of MIC,
in Number of Octets)
0x00 000 None None OFF NO (M=0)
0x01 001 AES-CBC-MAC-32 MIC-32 OFF YES (M=4)
0x02 010 AES-CBC-MAC-64 MIC-64 OFF YES (M=8)
0x03 011 AES-CBC-MAC-128 MIC-128 OFF YES (M=16)
0x04 100 AES-CTR ENC ON NO (M=0)
0x05 101 AES-CCM-32 ENC-MIC-32 ON YES (M=4)
0x06 110 AES-CCM-64 ENC-MIC-64 ON YES (M=8)
0x07 111 AES-CCM-128 ENC-MIC-128 ON YES (M=16)
2.2 Current Attacks
Several attacks are currently possible against ZigBee networks. Some examples are
sniffing, physical attacks, replay attacks, and denial-of-service attacks. This section
discusses the theory behind these attacks and some of the software and hardware tools
available to accomplish these attacks.
2.2.1 Theory.
2.2.1.1 Sniffing.
A sniffing attack is the collection of information from a network. Given correct
hardware and software, sniffing packets from a ZigBee network is fairly straightforward.
Some ZigBee networks do not use encryption [RMSB13]. In these networks,
communications are easily sniffed by anyone with the proper equipment.
When a ZigBee network uses the standard security level, it is possible for the
network key to be sent over the air in plaintext, which can be easily intercepted through
sniffing. This can be prevented by preinstalling the network key on ZigBee devices or
using high security [VHnA+13].
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2.2.1.2 Replay Attacks.
A replay attack consists of an attacker recording legitimate traffic on a network and
replaying it at a later time to cause malicious effects. In ZigBee networks that do not use
encryption, replay attacks are straightforward [CWL10]. Replay attacks can be
circumvented in ZigBee through implementation of a freshness counter. Every packet
transmitted is assigned a freshness number and the counter is incremented. Packets are
only accepted if their freshness number is greater than the freshness counter. In practice,
the freshness counter can cause problems because it must be manually reset by the
administrator of the ZigBee network [VHnA+13].
2.2.1.3 Physical Attacks.
Physical attacks involve locating and tampering with a device. If a ZigBee device is
located, it can be subjected to a physical attack.
Goodspeed has shown that keys can be extracted from several ZigBee devices if
physical access is achieved [Goo09]. First generation chip sets consist of a radio and
microcontroller on separate chips. Using contact probes, keys can be sniffed off the bus
between the two chips. Second generation devices contain both radio and microcontroller
on a single chip. However, a vulnerability exists that allows an attacker to dump keys off
of a ZigBee device by analyzing flash memory [Goo09].
ZigBee networks do not invalidate keys when a device is removed from a network,
allowing keys stolen in this manner to be used against the network [DT10].
2.2.1.4 Denial-of-Service.
There are currently several methods of disrupting service on a ZigBee network.
Some include maximization of the frame counter, reflexive jamming, acknowledgment
spoofing, and selective jamming.
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One possible denial-of-service attack against a ZigBee network is to set the frame
counter to the maximum possible value. If the MIC is not verified, as is the case under
some security configurations, the frame counter can be used to force ZigBee devices to
ignore legitimate packets. Even if the contents of a packet are gibberish, the frame counter
value will still be accepted. Packets received after the malicious packet with lower frame
counter values will be ignored by the device. Since the frame counter is at a maximum, no
packets will be accepted until the frame counter is reset [VHnA+13].
Reflexive jamming is when a malicious device sniffs a network for communications
and then immediately switches into transmission mode. It then broadcasts noise to cause
interference with packet reception [GBM+12].
Acknowledgment spoofing is when a device is tricked into thinking that a packet it
sent was received when in fact it was not. This is achieved by jamming a desired packet.
The attacker then sends an acknowledgment to the victim device to make it appear that the
packet was received [GBM+12].
Selective jamming works by sniffing a network and waiting for a specific
transmission and then transmitting noise or another packet to disrupt the transmission.
Due to the current technology’s speed constraints, this technique is mainly used against
ZigBee networks to jam acknowledgment packets [GBM+12].
2.2.2 KillerBee.
One of the earliest tools created to manipulate and attack ZigBee networks is
KillerBee. KillerBee is a free and open source tool written by Joshua Wright. Since
KillerBee is written in Python, it is able to be used in both Linux, Windows, and OS X. Its
goal is to simplify attack tasks and explore the attack surface of ZigBee networks and
devices. KillerBee offers several tools including zbstumbler, zbdump, zbreplay, zbdsniff,
and zbfind [CWL10].
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Zbstumbler is a tool designed to identify nearby ZigBee networks. It works in a way
similar to conventional WiFi discovery. Zbstumbler transmits beacon request frames and
hops to a different channel every two seconds. ZigBee devices within range reply to the
beacon requests with information about the network as required by the specification.
Since beacon requests and beacon frames are integral to the operation of the ZigBee
protocol, this type of discovery is impossible to stop [CWL10].
Zbdump is a packet sniffer designed to capture ZigBee traffic on a particular channel,
specified with the -f flag. The contents are directed to a libpcap file designated by the -w
flag or a Daintree SNA capture via the -W flag [CWL10].
Zbreplay is an implementation of a replay attack against a ZigBee network. It takes
the contents of a libpcap file or Daintree SNA capture file and replays it on the ZigBee
channel specified by the -f flag [CWL10].
Zbdsniff is a key sniffer. It parses a packet capture file for Key-Transport commands
and displays the key if one is found [CWL10] .
Zbfind is a tool used to locate the physical location of ZigBee devices. It takes the
power received from any packets received and outputs it to the user. The user can use this
information to move closer to a device as the signal strength increases [CWL10].
Zbassocflood is a denial-of-service tool that implements an attack that attempts to
associate to a PAN to cause a target device to crash [SR13]. This attack works by
exhausting the number of devices with which the target device associates. Once a device
is connected with too many other devices, it crashes.
2.2.2.1 KillerBee Hardware.
Although KillerBee can be used with any hardware that can interact with 802.15.4
networks, the primary development hardware is the RZUSBSTICK. It only interacts with
ZigBee networks in the 2.4 GHz frequency band. The RZUSBSTICK also requires
specialized firmware to be able to inject packets into a ZigBee network. This firmware is
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distributed along with the KillerBee framework. However, in order to reprogram the
RZUSBSTICK, another piece of hardware, an Atmel on-chip programmer, is
required [CWL10].
KillerBee also offers support for the GoodFet, a device that uses the Joint Test Action
Group (JTAG) protocol to interface with ZigBee chips. The GoodFet can be used to dump
the memory of a ZigBee chip. The zbgoodfind tool can then be used to extract keys from
the memory dump [CWL10].
2.2.3 Api-do.
Api-do is another set of tools intended for penetration testing of ZigBee networks
that builds upon the KillerBee framework. Api-do contains tools for sniffing, frame
injection, and jamming [GBM+12]. Specifically, the project website contains the OpenEar,
Scapy dot15d4, and zbWarDrive tools along with the KillerBee framework [SMB12].
The OpenEar tool integrates multiple RZUSBSTICKs together to listen on all 16
ZigBee channels in the 2.4 GHz frequency band. This is done by using multiple program
threads to run multiple instances of the KillerBee packet capture process. The zbWarDrive
tool injects a beacon request frame to determine if ZigBee networks are in the vicinity
based on beacon responses [GBM+12].
In order to effect responses in a ZigBee network, proper 802.15.4 frames must be
constructed. To create 802.15.4 frames, Api-do implements dot15d4, a layer extension for
Scapy, which is a powerful networking tool that allows a user to create packets manually.
The extension allows for packets to be generated for ZigBee and transmitted by
conventional hardware [GBM+12].
2.3 Software Defined Radio
Mitola notes that SDR can be defined as a radio that implements a specific range of
capabilities through elements that are software-reconfigurable [Mit99]. Another definition
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of SDR from the Software Defined Radio Forum is a ”Radio in which some or all of the
physical layer functions are Software Defined” [For11]. SDR allows for common
hardware to implement a family of radios or switch between implementations. It allows
for radios to be reprogrammed on the fly to solve bug fixes and upgrades leading to a
longer life cycle and reduced maintenance time and cost [For11].
2.3.1 GNU Radio.
GNU Radio is an open source software development toolkit for the implementation
of USRPs. It offers signal processing blocks that are typically written in C++, while
higher-level applications are written in Python. GNU Radio also includes GNU Radio
Companion which acts as a graphical user interface to connect signal blocks
together [Lan13].
2.3.2 Universal Software Radio Peripheral.
One of the SDRs supported by GNU Radio is the USRP [Lan13]. The USRP family
is built by Ettus Research, a subsidiary of National Instruments. Ettus Research builds
several SDR products including devices that are controlled by a computer and
communicate via USB or Ethernet [ER14]. USRP Hardware Driver (UHD) is the software
driver for GNU Radio that controls the USRP. It was implemented to be a standard driver
for all USRPs, regardless of connection type [SEB12].
National Instruments offers a basic record and playback tool that uses LabVIEW, a
product of the parent company. Known as “NI USRP Record and Playback - I16”, it
allows a user to record and playback raw RF with a USRP [Ins12].
2.3.3 ZigBee on Software Defined Radio.
There are several research projects for implementing ZigBee in GNU Radio. The
main project of implementing ZigBee on the USRP was written by Thomas Schmid.
Schmid also did a study on the feasibility of the USRP in 802.15.4 networks. The study
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concluded that the USRP is able to decode 92.8% of the messages compared to a ZigBee
device [SSS07].
Dabčević used Schmid’s code to implement a transmitter and receiver on the USRP
and measure packet reception rates. Dabčević was able to maintain reception between two
USRPs at up to 30 meters with blocked line of sight [Dab11].
Thandee used Schmid’s code, updated the compatibility with UHD, and then
implemented it on the USRP E100 to broadcast a message with arbitrary payload. The
USRP E100 is the embedded version of the USRP [Tha12].
2.4 Summary
This chapter discussed the ZigBee Protocol. It then detailed some of the current
attacks against the ZigBee Protocol. Finally, this chapter discussed SDR and attempts to
implement ZigBee on a specific SDR, the USRP.
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III. Methodology
3.1 Problem Definition
This research compares the performance of different categories of ZigBee attack
tools by implementing a replay attack against a target at various distances.
3.1.1 Goals and Hypothesis.
The goal of this research is to compare the performance and range of a replay attack
against a ZigBee network. Specifically, it compares an implementation of a replay attack
conducted with a laptop and RZUSBSTICK and compares it to the probability of success
and power ratings of the replay attack for the USRP at the same distances. The Atmel
RZUSBSTICK is the recommended hardware for the KillerBee attack suite [CWL10].
The USRP is a relatively inexpensive SDR that should be capable of implementing the
ZigBee protocol [Dab11].
Due to superior transmission power, the USRP is expected achieve a higher
probability of success at greater distances than the RZUSBSTICK.
3.1.2 Approach.
The approach of this research is to implement a specific replay attack on a laptop
with USB dongle and a USRP. The attack is conducted on a ZigBee device at varying
distances.
3.2 System Boundaries
As shown in Figure 3.1, the system under test (SUT) is the ZigBee Replay Attack
System. It includes a targeted ZigBee Device (victim), malicious user with the equipment
to perform a replay attack (attacking device), and a sensor at the victim device to record
outcomes. Other parts of the system include the wireless network and physical layout of
the devices. The component under test (CUT) is the attacking device.
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Figure 3.1: System Under Test
3.3 System Services
The service provided by the system is the execution of a replay attack against a
chosen victim device. For the purpose of this test network, the attack consists of a beacon
request frame sent from the attacking device. The victim should provide a corresponding
beacon with information about the network. The system has two outcomes. The victim
device either responds with a beacon or it does not. A success is defined as a beacon
frame being returned to the attacker after it has been requested.
3.4 Workload
The workload of the system is the simulated replay attack. The attacking device
transmits a beacon request frame. The victim then responds with a beacon frame. A
sensor near the victim senses the power levels of both transmissions.
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3.5 Performance Metrics
System performance is measured by the success or failure of the replay attack and the
power level of the beacon request received at the victim. Each trial is a binomial test.
Success is the attacker eliciting a beacon frame from the victim device. Failure is no
response from the victim. The possibility of false positives and false negatives exists. A
false positive is when a beacon is sent by the victim when directed by a device other than
the attacking node. To minimize the likelihood of false positives, experiments are
conducted at least 300 meters away from other ZigBee or 802.15.4 networks. A false
negative is when a beacon frame is sent by the victim device when directed by the
attacking device, but is not noticed by the sensor. Since the recording of the beacon
request frame using the NI USRP Record and Playback - I16 tool is three seconds long
and contains only one beacon request frame, the trials occur at least three seconds apart.
The overall performance of each configuration is measured by a probability of
success. The probability of success is the number of successes in a given configuration
divided by the total number of trials in said configuration. Performance is also evaluated
based on the power received at the victim device. However, since the device used as the
victim cannot directly report the power received, the power measured is the power
reported by the sensor. The sensor returns a received signal strength indication (RSSI)
value which can be converted to power in decibel referenced to one
milliwatt (dbm) [RMW12].
P = 3 × RS S I − 91 (3.1)
3.6 System Parameters
Several parameters affect system performance.
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• Brand and Model of Device Used - Several companies manufacture hardware based
on the ZigBee standard. Variances between manufacturers and models introduce
differences in range between devices.
• External Interference - External Interference can change the noise floor so that
transmissions can fail if the signal strength is not enough. The experiments are
conducted away from other ZigBee devices. Also, the attack is conducted on
ZigBee channel 26 (2.48 GHz), which does not overlap with WiFi, although bleed
over could still affect the experiment.
• Security Implementation/Posture - The implementation of security, or lack thereof,
affects the probability of success of a replay attack. Devices that have replay
protection and/or encryption enabled can be less susceptible to attack. All devices in
this experiment operate without any encryption or integrity checks. However, since
beacon frames cannot be disabled, the security implementation should not have a
large effect.
• Signal Strength - The strength of the signal received by the target device dictates
that device’s ability to interpret the command received. This directly affects the
probability of success for any given command.
– Antenna Type and Orientation - The type of antenna used by both the
transmitting and receiving device determines the strength of the signal sent or
received. The orientation of an antenna affects how much power is sent in a
given direction. This is especially true for directed antennae. Omnidirectional
antennae can have null spots where little to no power reaches.
– Distance Between Devices - The signal received by the victim device
decreases by the square of the distance between devices.
19
– Device Motion - Although many ZigBee devices are stationary, it is possible
for a mobile platform to implement the ZigBee protocol. A ZigBee device in
motion would have a variable distance from it to the next node. Therefore,
signal strength would be variable. Mobile devices are not investigated in this
thesis.
– Physical Layout - The ability of the attacker to be in direct line of sight with
the victim affects the strength of signal received by the victim.
– Time of Day - The time day could affect the signal strength and thus the
probability of success while outside. This is possibly due to changes in
background radiation.
• Type of Device Used - The architecture on which a ZigBee stack is implemented
will change system performance. The device type could be one of many types of
standalone devices, a USB dongle, a SDR, or any device that can implement the
ZigBee standard. The specific devices used in this thesis are discussed in
Section 3.7.
3.7 Factors
The following factors are used in the scope of this thesis.
• Antenna Type - The USB dongle has an internal antenna that cannot be changed.
The SDR is attached to an external antenna, which is either an omni-directional and
a directed antenna. This factor has three levels: internal, external, and directional
antenna.
– Antenna Orientation - The omnidirectional antenna is oriented in such a way
that nulls spots, as shown in Figure 3.2, do not include the victim device. The
directed antenna is oriented to point at the victim device. The antenna pattern
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of the RZUSBSTICK is not known, so a pilot study is conducted. Two
RZUSBSTICKs are positioned three meters apart in one of eight tested
orientations as shown in Figure 3.3. Since the RZUSBSTICK is a USB
dongle, it must be plugged into a laptop. Thus, orientations seven and eight
have one or two laptop(s) between the RZUSBSTICKs. The results of the
study are shown in Figure 3.4. The results indicate that the first orientation
allows the most amount of power to be transmitted between the two
RZUSBSTICKs. Therefore, the RZUSBSTICK is oriented to point at the
victim device as in orientation 1 in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.2: Antenna Pattern for Omnidirectional Antenna
[ver09]
• Physical Layout - The experiment is conducted in two parts: indoors and outdoors.
While outdoors, the victim and attacker are always in direct line of sight. When in
an indoor setting, the two nodes have two closets and between four and six walls
blocking line of sight. The walls are consistent throughout the experiment. A map
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(a) Orientation 1:
Co-Linear, both sticks
pointing at each other.
(b) Orientation 2: Per-
pendicular, one stick is
pointing at the other.
(c) Orientation 3: Per-
pendicular, one stick is
pointing at the other,
which is on its side.
(d) Orientation 4: Par-
allel, the sticks are par-
allel to each other.
(e) Orientation 5: Par-
allel, both sticks are on
their sides.
(f) Orientation 6: Par-
allel, the sticks are par-
allel to each other with
one on its side.
(g) Orientation 7:
Co-Linear, the sticks
are pointing away from
each other with two
laptops between them.
(h) Orientation 8: Per-
pendicular, one stick is
pointing away from the
other, which is perpen-
dicular to it. There is
one laptop between the
sticks.
Figure 3.3: Orientations Tested during Pilot Study
of the victim locations are shown in Figure 3.5. This factor has two levels: indoors
(no line of sight) and outdoors (line of sight).
• Distance Between Devices - Distance between the victim and attacking device vary
during the experiment. Two sets of distances are used in this thesis. While the
devices are in line of sight, measurements are taken in twenty meter increments
between 20 and 100 meters. The advertised range of ZigBee is 100 meters,
therefore the experiment is conducted in ten meter increments between 100 and 150
meters [Zig13]. Interesting areas are evaluated further at five meter increments.
While the devices are not in line of sight, the distance varies linearly in five meter
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Figure 3.4: Results of the Atmel RZUSBSTICK Orientation Pilot Study
increments from 15 to 35 meters. This factor has ten levels while in line of sight:
20, 40, 60, 80, 100, 110, 120, 130, 140, and 150 meters. It has five levels while not
in line of sight: 15, 20, 25, 30, and 35 meters.
• Time of Day - To determine that time of day is a factor, a pilot study was conducted.
To determine the effect time of day has, the replay attack described in Section 3.8
was run in the afternoon and evening. The afternoon data set was collected between
1300 and 1405 hours. The evening data set was collected between 1910 and 1945
hours. The experiment was conducted in ten meter increments with thirty trials
each. Additional samples are taken in 5 meter increments near locations where the
reception is less than 25%. Since the afternoon data set has more locations with that
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Figure 3.5: A Map of the Indoor Locations
criteria, the afternoon data set took a longer time to complete. Figure 3.6 shows the
probability of success results of this pilot study. When run in the evening, the
probability of success for the RZUSBSTICK is 100% until approximately 100
meters. The reception rate does not drop to 0% until approximately 130 meters.
When run in the afternoon, the probability of success for the RZUSBSTICK is
nearly 100% until approximately 60 meters. The reception rate does not drop to 0%
until approximately 110 meters. Between 60 and 110 meters, the probability of
success of the afternoon run varies significantly. Due to more samples being taken
in the afternoon,
During the main experiment, in order to minimize the effect of the time of day of the
experiment, two repetitions of the experiment are performed. The first starts at 20
meters and increases in distance. The second starts at 150 meters and decreases in
distance. Both start around noon, local time, and finish between 1700 and 1900,
local time. This is only for the line of sight experiment as the blocked line of sight
24
experiment is run indoors, and the time of day should not affect the experiment
when indoors.
Figure 3.6: Probability of Success of the RZUSBSTICK while in Line of Sight of the
Victim in the Afternoon and Evening
• Type of Device Used - Two separate device types are investigated: a RZUSBSTICK
dongle attached to a laptop computer and a USRP SDR. This factor has two levels,
but by its nature, they are incorporated into the antenna type factor. However, the
USRP is also configured in one of two ways, as a raw RF repeater and with a
ZigBee stack via GNU Radio.
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– Raw RF repeater - Using the NI USRP Record and Playback - I16 tool, the
USRP records a beacon request frame as raw RF energy before the
experiment. This beacon request frame is recorded during the power on
sequence of a ZigBee device. The Record and Playback tool saves the raw
energy as a binary file and includes noise from the RF band that the beacon
request frame is recorded. During the experiment, the frame is replayed by the
NI USRP Record and Playback - I16 tool as is.
– GNU Radio - The USRP is configured with GNU Radio. The implementation
is the similar as used by Thandee, but has been modified to transmit beacon
request frames. A similar beacon request frame is captured during the power
on sequence of a ZigBee device using KillerBee’s zbdump tool and saved as a
pcap file. This file is analyzed and the bits that are used are inserted into the
code used by Thandee. The contents of the frame are (in hexadecimal): 03 08
37 FF FF FF FF 07 39 F2. The pcap file is then used by the RZUSBSTICK via
KillerBee’s zbreplay tool. The modified file from Thandee [Tha12], as well as
the scripts using that file, are shown in Appendix B.
• USRP Transmission Gain Setting - The USRP is given three gain settings: a high,
medium, and low setting. The medium and low setting are set to 15 decibel (db) and
3 db, respectively. The National Instruments software allows for gain settings of up
to 30 db. GNU Radio recommends that the gain setting not be set higher than 20 db.
The high setting is 30 db and 20 db for the raw RF repeater and GNU Radio
configurations, respectively.
Table 3.1 summarizes the factors and their levels in this experiment. Table 3.2
summarizes those factors that are specific to the USRP.
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Table 3.1: Summary of Factors and Levels
Factor Levels
Antenna Type
Internal
Omnidirectional
Directed
Physical Layout
Outdoor
Indoor
Device
RZUSBSTICK
USRP
Distance Between Devices (Outdoor)
20 m
40 m
60 m
80 m
100 m
110 m
120 m
130 m
140 m
150 m
Distance Between Devices (Indoor)
15 m
20 m
25 m
30 m
35 m
Table 3.2: Summary of Factors and Levels Pertaining to the USRP
Factor Levels
USRP Configuration
Raw RF Repeater
GNU Radio
USRP Transmit Gain
3 db
15 db
30 db/20 db
3.8 Evaluation Technique
System evaluation is determined by experimentation. The experiment is conducted in
two parts. In the first part, the USRP uses National Instrument’s record and playback tool
as a raw RF repeater. This experiment is conducted both indoors and outdoors. In the
second part, the USRP is configured to use GNU Radio. This experiment is only
conducted indoors.
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Figure 3.7 shows the sequence of the experiment. First, the attacker sends a beacon
request frame. Second, the victim device should respond with a beacon frame. Third, the
sensing laptop should detect both and register a RSSI number for each.
Figure 3.7: The Attack Sequence
3.8.1 Attacker.
Figure 3.8 shows the attacking setup. The KillerBee Laptop is a Dell Precision
M4600 laptop with an Intel core i7-2620M central processing unit (CPU) and 8 gigabytes
of random access memory (RAM) running Backtrack 5, revision 3 Linux operating
system and the KillerBee attack suite. It is connected to the Atmel RZUSBSTICK. A
second laptop, the USRP Laptop, is a Dell Precision M4500 with an Intel core i7-620M
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CPU and 8 gigabytes of RAM. It runs 64-bit Windows 7 and is connected to the USRP via
gigabit Ethernet. In this configuration, the USRP Laptop is running the NI USRP Record
and Playback - I16 tool via LabVIEW Version 13.0 (32-bit). The USRP is a National
Instruments NI USRP-2921 running firmware compatibility version 9 connected to
omnidirectional and directed antennae.
During the GNU Radio portion of the experiment, the USRP Laptop is changed to an
HP Envy 17 Laptop with an Intel i7-720Q CPU and 8 gigabytes of RAM running 32-bit
Linux Mint 15 operating system. The USRP Laptop is configured with USRP Hardware
Driver (UHD) version 003.004.005 as it is compatible with the firmware of the USRP,
which was not updated to the latest version as it was unknown if an update would make
the USRP incompatible with National Instrument’s software tool. GNU Radio version
3.6.1 is used.
Figure 3.8: The Attacking Setup
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3.8.2 Victim.
Figure 3.9 shows the victim setup. The victim devices is a Freescale MC13213
ZigBee device. The Sensing Laptop is a Dell Latitude D630 laptop with an Intel Core 2
Duo T7300 CPU and 2 gigabytes of RAM running Backtrack 5, revision 3 and KillerBee.
It uses a second RZUSBSTICK as an antenna. This laptop, using the zbfind tool, records
the RSSI signal strength of the replay attack near the victim as well as the beacon
response from the Freescale MC13213. This instrument is not extremely precise as the
RSSI signal strength is only reported as an integer. From (3.1), this means the sensor only
has a resolution of 3 dbm. Also, 0 RSSI is mapped to -91 dbm, thus the sensor cannot
detect 802.15.4 signals below that level. Data points that do not register a power level are
discarded, as opposed to set to zero, as it is impossible to determine if the power level was
extremely low or if there is another reason for the sensor to not receive the data.
Figure 3.9: The Victim Setup
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3.9 Experimental Design
Interaction between factors are determined by a full factorial experiment. From
Table 3.1 and Table 3.2, there are six factors. However, antenna type and device are
integrated together as the RZUSBSTICK can only use its internal antenna and the USRP
uses the other two antenna types, the omnidirectional and directed antennae. Thus, there
are seven attacking configurations: the RZUSBSTICK and the USRP with two antenna
types and three different transmit gain settings. Also, the levels of the distance factor is
different between the outdoor and indoor experiments, with 10 and 5 levels, respectively.
Since the GNU Radio portion of the experiment is only conducted inside, there are twenty
locations for the victim device. This leads to 140 configurations.
Each configuration is repeated multiple times. When the USRP acts as a raw RF
repeater, each experimental configuration is repeated 30 times. Due to superior
automation, when the USRP is configured with GNU Radio each experimental
configuration is repeated 100 times. Since there are 140 configurations with 105 requiring
30 trials and 35 requiring trials, 6650 trials are conducted. Once the experiment is
configured, each trial takes between three and six seconds. Each trial consists of an
attacking ZigBee device sending a saved ZigBee packet over the LR-WPAN to the victim
device. Set up consists of configuring the victim and attacking devices. Between each
experiment the attack platform moves to a set distance from the stationary victim. A
confidence level of 99 percent is used. Thirty repetitions of each experiment is enough to
ensure a sufficiently small variance.
3.10 Methodology Summary
The ZigBee Replay Attack System is used to conduct an analysis of replay attacks.
Several factors are varied including antenna type, distance between devices, physical
layout, and configuration of the attacking device. A captured beacon request frame is sent
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from the attacking device to the victim device in an effort to elicit a beacon frame. The
success or failure of the attack is recorded. The power of the attack near the victim is also
recorded.
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IV. Results and Analysis
This chapter presents and discusses the experimental results. The data sets are split
into those that maintain line of sight between the attacker and victim, those that do not,
and those that configure the USRP to use GNU Radio, for which data is only taken
indoors. Section 4.1 details the results of the line of sight portion of the experiment.
Section 4.2 details the results of the blocked line of sight portion of the experiment.
Section 4.3 details the results of the experiment when the USRP is configured to use GNU
Radio. Tables summarizing the data collected in this experiment are found in Appendix C.
4.1 Line of Sight Scenario
This section details the part of the experiment where the attacker is in line of sight of
the victim. It is further broken down by configuration of the attacker. Section 4.1.1
presents the performance of the RZUSBSTICK. Section 4.1.2 presents the data relating to
the USRP when it uses an omnidirectional antenna and compares it with the performance
of the RZUSBSTICK. Section 4.1.3 presents the performance of the USRP when it uses a
directed antenna and compares it with the RZUSBSTICK.
4.1.1 RZUSBSTICK.
Figure 4.1 shows the probability of success of the RZUSBSTICK during the line of
sight part of the experiment. In light of the reception of the RZUSBSTICK dropping
between 60 and 80 meters, data is taken at 70 and 65 meters. Data is collected for the
USRP at those data points for consistency as well. The probability of success graph can be
can be subdivided into three zones, a full reception zone, a transition zone, and an
out-of-range zone. A trend line with 99% confidence interval is added to the probability of
success graph of Figure 4.1 of the approximate transition zone. This line runs from 40 to
110 meters. Most of the data is within the confidence interval of the trend line.
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Figure 4.1: Probability of Success Versus Distance of the RZUSBSTICK
Figure 4.2 shows the power of the RZUSBSTICK during the line of sight part of the
experiment, as reported by the sensor. The received power of the replay attack drops
logarithmically until 65 meters before hitting the threshold of detection of the sensor at
-91 dbm. A trend line is added from 20 to 70 meters to show the relationship. Beyond 120
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meters, the sensor is unable to detect any of the attacks, so those data points have been
omitted from the power versus distance graph.
Figure 4.2: Power Versus Distance of the RZUSBSTICK
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4.1.2 Omnidirectional Antenna.
Figure 4.3, Figure 4.4, and Figure 4.5 display the probability of success of the USRP
with the omnidirectional antenna, using 30 db gain, 15 db gain, and 3 db gain,
respectively. As with the RZUSBSTICK, each of the graphs can be subdivided into three
zones, a full reception zone, a transition zone, and an out-of-range zone. A linear trend
line of the transition zone has been inserted for each of the graphs, and a 99% confidence
interval for the trend line is calculated and shaded on the graph. In Figure 4.4, the linear
trend line runs from 80 to 150 meters. In Figure 4.5, the transition zone and corresponding
trend line is from 65 to 110 meters. This trend line is not shown in Figure 4.3, as this
experiment is limited to 150 meters and a transition zone did not appear in that range. In
general, the data fits the linear trend lines. There are a few exceptions including the
medium power at 120 meters. The probability of success when using the USRP with 30
db gain also unexpectedly decreases at 120 meters.
Another anomaly is the reception of the USRP with 30 db transmit gain at close
range. There are two possible explainations. First, it is possibly due to the data being used
to attack the victim. When the beacon request frame was recorded, the recording also
included any background noise during the recording. It is possible that 30 db transmit gain
is so high as to make background noise indistinguishable from the actual data of the
frame. Second, the beacon request frame could possibly be transmitted with enough
power to saturate the victim.
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Figure 4.3: Probability of Success Versus Distance of the USRP with Omnidirectional
Antenna and 30 db Gain
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Figure 4.4: Probability of Success Versus Distance of the USRP with Omnidirectional
Antenna and 15 db Gain
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Figure 4.5: Probability of Success Versus Distance of the USRP with Omnidirectional
Antenna and 3 db Gain
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Figure 4.6: Power (dbm) of the RZUSBSTICK Compared to the USRP with Omnidirec-
tional Antenna while in Line of Sight of the Victim
Figure 4.6 shows the power received by the sensor near the victim device in dbm for
the RZUSBSTICK and the USRP using an omnidirectional antenna. Figure 4.7,
Figure 4.8, and Figure 4.9 display the power received by the sensor in separate plots. Data
points that were not measured due to reception reasons are omitted. Overall, each
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decreases in a similar, logarithmic fashion. There is some anomalous behavior beyond 120
meters. There is also an dip in power at 65 meters, but it is still within the confidence
interval of the logarithmic model.
Figure 4.7: Power (dbm) Versus Distance of the USRP with Omnidirectional Antenna and
30 db Gain
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Figure 4.8: Power (dbm) Versus Distance of the USRP with Omnidirectional Antenna and
15 db Gain
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Figure 4.9: Power (dbm) Versus Distance of the USRP with Omnidirectional Antenna and
3 db Gain
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4.1.3 Directed Antenna.
Figure 4.10: Probability of Success Versus Distance of the USRP with Directed Antenna
and 30 db Gain
Figure 4.10, Figure 4.11, and Figure 4.12 display the probability of success of the
USRP with the directed antenna. As with the omnidirectional antenna figures, each plot
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Figure 4.11: Probability of Success Versus Distance of the USRP with Directed Antenna
and 15 db Gain
has three zones. Linear trend lines and shaded 99% confidence intervals are added to the
transition zone of each. The attack with 30 db gain stays in the reception zone from 20
meters through 150 meters. The linear trend line of the transition zone of the USRP with
15 db gain is determined as 100 meters until the end of the experiment at 150 meters. The
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Figure 4.12: Probability of Success Versus Distance of the USRP with Directed Antenna
and 3 db Gain
linear trend line of the transition zone of the USRP with 3 db gain is determined to be
between 65 meters and 110 meters. The 30 db gain plot has similar low reception near the
attacker as the omnidirectional antenna. This is probably due to the same reasons for the
omnidirectional antenna’s failure at close range. Both the low and medium power
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receptions have drops in reception at 70 meters before rising to levels more in line with
the logarithmic trend line. The cause is unknown, but as those measurements occurred at
close to the same time of day, an external source of interference is possible.
Figure 4.13: Power (dbm) of the RZUSBSTICK Compared to the USRP with Directed
Antenna while in Line of Sight of the Victim
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Figure 4.14: Power (dbm) Versus Distance of the USRP with Directed Antenna and 30 db
Gain
Figure 4.13 shows the power received by the sensor near the victim device in dbm for
the RZUSBSTICK and the USRP using a directed antenna. Figure 4.14, Figure 4.15, and
Figure 4.16 display the power received by the sensor in separate plots. Again, data points
that were not measured due to reception reasons are omitted. Overall, each decreases in a
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Figure 4.15: Power (dbm) Versus Distance of the USRP with Directed Antenna and 15 db
Gain
similar fashion. Each appears logarithmic while the power level is above the power
threshold of the sensor. The USRP with directed antenna clearly delivers more power than
the RZUSBSTICK when the transmit gain is 15 or 30 db.
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Figure 4.16: Power (dbm) Versus Distance of the USRP with Directed Antenna and 3 db
Gain
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4.2 Indoor Scenario
This section details the indoor part of the experiment where the line of sight between
the attacker and victim is blocked. It is further broken down by configuration of the
USRP. Section 4.2.1 presents the performance of the RZUSBSTICK. Section 4.2.2
presents the data relating to the USRP when it uses an omnidirectional antenna and
compares it with the RZUSBSTICK. Section 4.2.3 presents the performance of the USRP
when it uses a directed antenna and compares it with the RZUSBSTICK.
4.2.1 RZUSBSTICK.
Figure 4.17 shows the success rate of the RZUSBSTICK during the indoor part of the
experiment, indicating that the probability of success of the RZUSBSTICK does not have
the characteristic three zone structure. Instead, the probability of success drops cleanly
from 100% reception to 0% reception between 20 and 25 meters. There is no transition
zone.
Figure 4.18 shows the power received by the sensor is at the detection threshold.
Since the victim is still responding to the beacon request frame, while the sensor reports
an RSSI number at the threshold, the replay attack requires less power to succeed against
the victim than the sensor is able to detect. Beyond 25 meters, neither the victim nor the
sensor can detect the RZUSBSTICK.
4.2.2 Omnidirectional Antenna.
Figure 4.19 shows the probability of success versus distance of the replay attack for
the RZUSBSTICK and the USRP using an omnidirectional antenna. While using a
transmit gain of 3 db, the USRP offers 67% reception at 15 meters before dropping to 0%
reception at 20 meters and beyond. With 15 db gain, the USRP has near 100% reception
from 15 to 25 meters. It then enters the characteristic transition zone between 25 and 30
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Figure 4.17: Probability of Success Versus Distance of the RZUSBSTICK
meters. With a transmit gain of 30 db, the USRP maintains 100% reception throughout
this section of the experiment despite line of sight being blocked.
Figure 4.20 displays the power versus distance of the RZUSBSTICK and USRP for
the indoor, blocked line of sight portion of the experiment. Figure 4.21 and Figure 4.23
display the power received by the sensor in separate plots. There is only a single mean for
the low power data set, so the graph is omitted. Figure 4.21 shows that the 30 db power
data set drops logarithmically until 30 meters where the power received falls
unexpectedly. Figure 4.22 shows the data set with a logarithmic trend line that has omitted
the 30 meter measurement. The power reading at 30 meters is clearly anomalous, but it is
unclear what caused the power to drop. An additional wall is between the 25 and 30 meter
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Figure 4.18: Power Versus Distance of the RZUSBSTICK
measurements, but that does not explain why the power at 35 meters is greater than the
power at 30 meters. The 30 meter measurement is best explained as an outlier. Figure 4.23
displays the power of the USRP with 15 db transmit gain. The power drops
logarithmically from 15 to 30 meters. The 35 meter measurement is at the detection
threshold of the sensor.
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Figure 4.19: Probability of Success of the RZUSBSTICK Compared to the USRP with
Omnidirectional Antenna while not in Line of Sight of the Victim
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Figure 4.20: Power (dbm) of the RZUSBSTICK Compared to the USRP with Omnidirec-
tional Antenna while not in Line of Sight of the Victim
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Figure 4.21: Power (dbm) Versus Distance of the USRP with Omnidirectional Antenna and
30 db Gain
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Figure 4.22: Power (dbm) Versus Distance of the USRP with Omnidirectional Antenna and
30 db Gain With More Appropriate Trend Line
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Figure 4.23: Power (dbm) Versus Distance of the USRP with Omnidirectional Antenna and
15 db Gain
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4.2.3 Directed Antenna.
Figure 4.24: Probability of Success of the RZUSBSTICK Compared to the USRP with
Directed Antenna while not in Line of Sight of the Victim
Figure 4.24 shows the probability of success versus distance of the replay attack for
the RZUSBSTICK and the USRP using a directed antenna. Each transmit gain setting on
the USRP offers superior reception to the RZUSBSTICK. The USRP transmitting at 3 db
is able to execute the attack successfully at 15 and 20 meters. At 25 meters, the
probability of success is approximately 50%. At further distances, there is 0% reception.
While using a transmit gain of 15 db, the USRP maintains reception through 30 meters.
The USRP with 30 db transmit gain is nearly 100% successful across all distances.
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Figure 4.25: Power (dbm) of the RZUSBSTICK Compared to the USRP with Directed
Antenna while in Line of Sight of the Victim
Figure 4.25 displays the power versus distance of the RZUSBSTICK and USRP with
directed antenna for the blocked line of sight portion of the experiment. Figure 4.26,
Figure 4.27, and Figure 4.28 display the power received by the sensor in separate plots.
The power received by the sensor near the victim appears to decay logarithmically with
distance for each gain setting of the USRP with directed antenna. This is interesting as
there are no large drops in power received when an additional wall is placed between the
attacker and victim. An additional wall is added between the 15 and 20 meter
measurements and again between the 25 and 30 meter measurements. Also, the power
received at 15 meters is similar to the power received at 20 meters. A larger drop would
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normally be expected. From the trend line, the power received at 15 and 20 meters does
not appear to be too far from the logarithmic model.
Figure 4.26: Power (dbm) Versus Distance of the USRP with Directed Antenna and 30 db
Gain
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Figure 4.27: Power (dbm) Versus Distance of the USRP with Directed Antenna and 15 db
Gain
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Figure 4.28: Power (dbm) Versus Distance of the USRP with Directed Antenna and 3 db
Gain
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4.3 GNU Radio Scenario
This section details the part of the experiment where the USRP is configured to use
GNU Radio and ZigBee stack. In this portion of the experiment, line of sight between the
attacker and victim is blocked. This section is further broken down by antenna used by the
USRP. Section 4.3.1 presents the performance of the RZUSBSTICK. Section 4.3.2
presents the data relating to the USRP when it uses an omnidirectional antenna and
compares it with the RZUSBSTICK. Section 4.3.3 presents the performance of the USRP
when it uses a directed antenna and compares it with the RZUSBSTICK. The
RZUSBSTICK does not use GNU Radio, but measurements are still taken to compare
with the USRP.
4.3.1 RZUSBSTICK.
Figure 4.29 shows the success rate of the RZUSBSTICK during the GNU Radio part
of the experiment. Since the number of trials is increased from 30 to 100 for this portion
of the experiment, the attack with RZUSBSTICK is redone with the new number of trials.
The RZUSBSTICK has similar results to the blocked line of sight experiment, as
expected; except for a difference in reception at 20 meters. The exact cause of this
deviation is unknown, but speculation is that the arrangement of furniture or items in
closets could have changed between the experiments and affected the results. In this case,
it has 100% reception at 15 meters and tapers off at 20 and 25 meters. Figure 4.30 shows
the power of the RZUSBSTICK during the GNU Radio part of the experiment. The power
never exceeds −91 dbm.
4.3.2 Omnidirectional Antenna.
Figure 4.31 shows the probability of success versus distance of the USRP using GNU
Radio and an omnidirectional antenna and RZUSBSTICK. The USRP using GNU Radio
demonstrates a poor success rate in executing the replay attack. When using a transmit
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Figure 4.29: Probability of Success Versus Distance of the RZUSBSTICK
gain of 3 db, the USRP is able to achieve a success rate of 71% at 15 meters and 0% at 20
meters and above. From the indoor scenario, the USRP is expected to successfully
complete the replay attack with transmit gains of 15 and 20 db, but the USRP is never able
to achieve a greater mean success rate than 25% with 15 or 20 db transmit gain. However,
the sensor was still able to sense ZigBee packets and register power levels for them.
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Figure 4.30: Power Versus Distance of the RZUSBSTICK
Figure 4.32 shows the probability that the sensor is able to detect a ZigBee packet
versus distance of the USRP with omnidirectional antenna. That is, Figure 4.32 shows
how often the sensor is able to measure the power near the victim and expresses it as a
probability. The RZUSBSTICK has similar reception on both the victim and sensor. The
reception is higher for the sensor at 20 meters. Reception is also similar for the USRP
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Figure 4.31: Probability of Success of the RZUSBSTICK Compared to the USRP with
Omnidirectional Antenna and GNU Radio while not in Line of Sight of the Victim
with a transmit gain of 3 db. However, the results are very different for transmit gains of
15 and 20 db. In this plot, there is a drop in reception at 25 meters. The cause is unknown.
Also, the reception rate is significantly higher against the sensor than against the victim.
The exact cause is unknown. However, the sensor and victim are different devices. It is
possible that this implementation of the ZigBee stack on GNU Radio is not entirely
compatible with the Freescale victim.
Figure 4.33 displays the power versus distance of the RZUSBSTICK and USRP for
the blocked line of sight portion of the experiment. Figure 4.34 and Figure 4.35 display
the power received by the sensor in separate plots. The low power data set consists of two
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Figure 4.32: Probability of Success against the sensor of the RZUSBSTICK Compared to
the USRP with Omnidirectional Antenna and GNU Radio while not in Line of Sight of the
Sensor
means, so the graph is omitted. Linear trend lines with 99% confidence intervals are added
to the high and medium power graphs. Both the medium and high power data sets drop
logarithmically during this part of the experiment.
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Figure 4.33: Power (dbm) of the RZUSBSTICK Compared to the USRP with Omnidirec-
tional Antenna and GNU Radio while not in Line of Sight of the Victim
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Figure 4.34: Power Versus Distance of the USRP with Omnidirectional Antenna and 20 db
Gain
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Figure 4.35: Power (dbm) Versus Distance of the USRP with Omnidirectional Antenna and
15 db Gain
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4.3.3 Directed Antenna.
Figure 4.36 shows the probability of success versus distance of the USRP using GNU
Radio and a directed antenna and RZUSBSTICK. From the indoor scenario, the success
rate of the USRP with 15 and 20 db transmit gain is expected to be nearly 100%. The
USRP using GNU Radio and a directed antenna demonstrates poor success rates when
executing the replay attack. It does offer slightly better reception than that achieved by the
omnidirectional antenna. The USRP with 20 db transmit gain is able to achieve a
maximum success rate of 77% at 20 meters. However, the sensor is still able to sense
ZigBee packets from the USRP and RZUSBSTICK and register power levels for them.
Figure 4.36: Probability of Success of the RZUSBSTICK Compared to the USRP with
Directed Antenna and GNU Radio while not in Line of Sight of the Victim
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Figure 4.37: Probability of Success of the sensor for the RZUSBSTICK Compared to the
USRP with Directed Antenna and GNU Radio while not in Line of Sight of the Victim
Figure 4.37 graphs the probability that the sensor was able to detect the replay attack
from the RZUSBSTICK and USRP with directed antenna. The sensor is much better at
detecting the replay attack from the USRP than the Freescale victim; the sensor detects
897 of the 1500 attacks whereas the victim only responds to 310. The sensor is able to
detect the attack from the USRP with directed antenna and 3 transmit gain at 15 meters. It
is undetectable from 20 meters on. The sensor can detect beacon request frames sent by
the USRP with medium power at 15 and 20 meters. Reception begins to taper off at 30
meters and is detectable 27% of the time at 35 meters. The sensor is able to detect the
USRP with high power with a high success rate up to 30 meters. At 35 meters reception
begins to taper.
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Figure 4.38: Power (dbm) of the RZUSBSTICK Compared to the USRP with Directed
Antenna and GNU Radio while in Line of Sight of the Victim
Figure 4.38 displays the power versus distance of the RZUSBSTICK and USRP for
the blocked line of sight portion of the experiment. Figure 4.39 and Figure 4.40, display
the power received by the sensor in separate plots. The low power data set consists of a
single mean, so the graph is omitted. Linear trend lines with 99% confidence intervals are
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Figure 4.39: Power (dbm) Versus Distance of the USRP with Directed Antenna and 30 db
Gain
added to the high and medium power graphs. Both the medium and high power data sets
drop logarithmically during this part of the experiment. Both data sets are consistent with
a logarithmic model.
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Figure 4.40: Power (dbm) Versus Distance of the USRP with Directed Antenna and 15 db
Gain
4.4 Summary
Overall, the data shows that the USRP, when using the National Instruments NI
USRP Record and Playback - I16 tool, is able to conduct a successful replay attack at
greater distances than the RZUSBSTICK. When outdoors, in line of sight, the USRP is
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able to conduct replay attacks at 150 meters whereas the RZUSBSTICK has a range of
100 meters. When indoors, the USRP achieves a range of 35 meters, as opposed to the
RZUSBSTICK which has a range of 20 meters. However, when the USRP is configured to
use GNU Radio, the reliability of the attack drops. The USRP is still able to be detected at
ranges of up to 35 meters by the RZUSBSTICK sniffer, but not at a 100% reception rate.
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V. Conclusion
This chapter presents the conclusions drawn from this research. Section 5.1 discusses
how the results of the experiment relate to the goals for this research. Section 5.2 discusses
the impact of this research. Section 5.3 presents recommendations for future work.
5.1 Research Conclusions
The goal of this research is to determine the viability of the USRP as a tool for
exploring and attacking ZigBee and 802.15.4 networks. Specifically, the goal is to
determine if the USRP can achieve an attack range greater than that of a conventional
ZigBee USB dongle radio — the Atmel RZ Raven USB stick (RZUSBSTICK).
The results indicate a fairly large difference in range between the USRP and
RZUSBSTICK. When in line of sight, the RZUSBSTICK is observed to have a range of
up to 110 meters. The range of the USRP with omnidirectional antenna and 30 db transmit
gain is over 150 meters, the maximum distance tested in this research. However, at high
power, the USRP is unable to successfully complete the attack. If the transmit gain is
lowered to 15 or 3 db, the close range attacks can be achieved.
In order to make the attack more efficient, GNU Radio is used to implement a ZigBee
stack on the USRP. From the line of sight and blocked line of sight experiments, the
USRP is physically capable of carrying out effective replay attacks. However, when the
USRP implements a ZigBee stack on GNU Radio, it is not reliable enough to affect all
ZigBee devices.
5.2 Impact of Research
This research investigates the feasibility of the USRP as a tool for exploring and
attacking ZigBee and other 802.15.4 networks. Also, this research has shown that an
78
attacker can easily exploit a ZigBee network using no security at over 150 meters in line
of sight and over 35 meters with a blocked line of sight. A similar attack could be used to
disarm ZigBee residential doorlocks. An attacker could sniff a packet that is sent to
unlock a ZigBee door lock and then replay it at a later date to gain access to the residence.
Many other attacks are possible including those mentioned in Chapter 2. This underscores
the need to secure ZigBee networks, including residential and commercial.
5.3 Future Work
The implementation of GNU Radio used in this thesis is unable to reliably perform a
replay attack against ZigBee devices. The exact reason requires further research. The
issue could be in the version of GNU Radio, the version of USRP firmware used, or the
implementation of ZigBee in GNU Radio. The most up-to-date version of the UHD
software, USRP firmware, and GNU Radio should be used. Other SDR platforms and
implementations should be investigated to find effective and cost-efficient platforms to
explore 802.15.4 networks. As KillerBee is a Python-based program, an integration of the
KillerBee framework into GNU Radio is a logical step.
5.4 Summary
This research focused on a comparison of range in the USRP and RZUSBSTICK
during replay attacks against ZigBee devices. Overall, the USRP is able to achieve better
range than the RZUSBSTICK, but improvements in usability and reliability are required.
However, cost is a factor that must be taken into account. At this time, the USRP used in
this research costs $1,700, whereas the RZUSBSTICK costs approximately
$40 [ER14] [CWL10]. Depending on the desired flexibilty of the system, the
RZUSBSTICK is a more cost-effective method of manipulating ZigBee networks.
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Appendix A: GNURadio Installation Directions
This appendix contains directions on the installation of a ZigBee stack for the
USRP2 using GNU Radio on a Linux operating system.
A.1 Prerequisites
The programs require Subversion and Git to obtain their respective sources.
sudo apt-get install subversion git
GNU Radio has a long list of requirements. For Ubuntu Linux, the exact
requirements can be found at
http://gnuradio.org/redmine/projects/gnuradio/wiki/UbuntuInstall . For the version used in
this thesis, Raring Ringtail, the following command will install all prerequisites: [Lan13]
sudo apt-get -y install git-core autoconf automake libtool g++ python-dev swig \
pkg-config libfftw3-dev libboost1.53-all-dev libcppunit-dev libgsl0-dev \
libusb-dev sdcc libsdl1.2-dev python-wxgtk2.8 python-numpy \
python-cheetah python-lxml doxygen python-qt4 python-qwt5-qt4 libxi-dev \
libqt4-opengl-dev libqwt5-qt4-dev libfontconfig1-dev libxrender-dev qt4-default
A.2 UHD
In order to use the USRP with GNURadio, its controlling software must first be
installed. This software is referred to as UHD. The version used in this thesis is version
003.004.005. The following code will install that version. For other versions, replace the
checkout number with the appropriate version code.
git clone git://ettus.sourcerepo.com/ettus/uhd.git
cd uhd
git checkout 22103c8
80
cd host
mkdir build
cd build
cmake ../
make
make test
sudo make install
sudo ldconfig
A.3 GNU Radio
git clone http://gnuradio.org/git/gnuradio.git
cd gnuradio
git checkout 0d47f1353a90a54cdb84e40a847191976ca3b401
mkdir build
cd build
cmake ../
make
make test
sudo make install
sudo ldconfig
Everything from /usr/local/include/gruel/swig might need to be copied or linked into
/usr/local/include/gnuradio/swig before the next part is executed.
A.4 UCLA Physical
svn co https://www.cgran.org/cgran/projects/ucla_zigbee_phy/trunk ucla_zigbee_phy
cd ucla_zigbee_phy
./bootstrap && ./configure && make
make check
sudo make install
81
A.5 Utah Update
git clone git://wiesel.ece.utah.edu/gr-ieee802-15-4.git
cd gr-ieee802-15-4
./bootstrap && ./configure && make
make check
sudo make install
There are some problems with the code. In ieee802 15 4 pkt.py,
import Numeric
should be commented out and replaced with
import numpy
In ieee802 15 4.py, add the line
from gnuradio import digital
and change
self.clock_recovery = gr.clock_recovery_mm_ff(omega, gain_omega, mu, gain_mu,
omega_relative_limit)
to
self.clock_recovery = digital.clock_recovery_mm_ff(omega, gain_omega, mu, gain_mu,
omega_relative_limit)
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Appendix B: Replay Attack Scripts and Python Source Files
This appendix contains the scripts used to conduct the replay attacks in this research
as well as the modified Python source code used in GNU Radio to transmit a beacon
request frame.
B.1 KillerBee Replay Attack Script
This script contains the KillerBee replay attack script as used in the GNU Radio part
of the experiment. It conducts 100 replay attacks using the zbreplay program from the
KillerBee framework. It replays the contents of the file beacon.pcap, a single beacon
request frame, once every five seconds as zbreplay has an automatic 1 second delay. For
the line of sight and blocked line of sight portions of the experiment, the 100 would need
to be changed to 30 in order to lower the number of repetitions.
#! /bin/bash
for i in {1..100}
do
echo "Run $i"
zbreplay -f 26 -r beacon.pcap
sleep 4
done
B.2 GNU Radio Replay Attack Script
This script contains the GNU Radio replay attack script as used in the GNU Radio
part of the experiment. It conducts 100 replay attacks of beacon request frames as
specified by the -b flag. It sends a single beacon request frame approximately every five
seconds as it takes around three seconds to run the Python script. This script uses 3 db
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transmit gain as specified by the -g flag, but that is changed to 15 and 20 for the medium
and high transmit gain tests, respectively.
#! /bin/bash
for i in {1..100}
do
echo "Run $i"
python usrp2_txtest.py -x 1 -X 1 -b -g 3
sleep 2
done
B.3 GNU Radio Beacon Request Python File
This Python script was converted to create the -b flag which sends a beacon request
frame instead of the string ”Hello World”. Modifications to the code are underlined.
#!/ usr / bin / env python
#
# Transmitter of IEEE 802.15.4 RADIO Packets .
#
# Modified by : Thomas Schmid , Sanna Leidelof
#
# March 2012 Modified by: Rithirong Thandee
# December 2013 Modified by: Scott Dalrymple
from gnuradio import gr, eng_notation
from gnuradio import uhd
from gnuradio import ucla
from gnuradio.ucla_blks import ieee802_15_4_pkt
from gnuradio.eng_option import eng_option
from optparse import OptionParser
import math, struct, time
class transmit_path(gr.top_block):
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def __init__(self,options):
gr.top_block.__init__(self)
self.normal_gain = 8000
self._spb = 2
self.u = uhd.usrp_sink( device_addr ="", io_type=uhd.io_type.COMPLEX_FLOAT32,num_channels=1)
self.u.set_samp_rate(options.sample_rate)
self.u.set_center_freq(options.cordic_freq)
self.u.set_gain(options.gain)
# transmitter
self.packet_transmitter=ieee802_15_4_pkt.ieee802_15_4_mod_pkts(self, spb=self._spb, msgq_limit=2)
self.gain = gr.multiply_const_cc(self.normal_gain)
self.connect(self.packet_transmitter, self.gain, self.u)
def set_gain(self, gain):
self.gain = gain
self.subdev.set_gain(gain)
def send_pkt(self, options, payload =’’, eof = False):
if options.beacon:
payload=struct.pack("B",0x07)
return self.packet_transmitter.send_pkt(0x37, struct.pack("HH",0xFFFF,0xFFFF),payload,eof)
else:
return self.packet_transmitter.send_pkt(0xe5,
struct.pack ("HHHHHHHHH",
#PAN ID
0x5678,
#addresss1
0x5A70,
0x4063,
0xA200,
0x0013,
#address2
0x5A22,
0x4063,
0xA200,
0x0013),
payload,
eof)
def main():
parser = OptionParser ( option_class = eng_option )
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parser.add_option ("-A", "--antenna", type="string", default=None,
help="Select Antenna where appropriate (J1 or J0)")
parser.add_option ("-c", "--cordic-freq", type ="eng_float", default=2480000000,
help ="set Tx cordic frequency to FREQ ", metavar =" FREQ ")
parser.add_option ("-r", "--data-rate", type ="eng_float", default=4000000)
parser.add_option ("-g", "--gain", type="eng_float", default=15,
help="set Rx PGA gain in dB 0,20")
parser.add_option ("-s", "--sample_rate", type ="eng_float", default =4000000)
parser.add_option ("-x", "--num_msg", type="int", default=1000)
parser.add_option ("-X", "--spacing", type="eng_float", default=0.001)
parser.add_option ("-b", "--beacon", action="store_true", dest="beacon", default=False,
help="send a beacon request frame instead")
(options, args) = parser.parse_args()
print options
print args
tb = transmit_path( options )
tb.start()
for i in range ( options.num_msg ):
print "send message %d:" %(i)
if options.beacon:
tb.send_pkt(options)
print "Sending a Beacon Request"
else:
print "Hello World = 48:65:6c:6c:6f:20:57:6f:72:6c:64"
tb.send_pkt(options, payload = struct.pack (’11B’,0x48, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x6f,
0x20, 0x57, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x6c, 0x64))
time.sleep(options.spacing)
tb.stop()
if __name__ == ’__main__’:
# insert this in your test code ...
import os
print ’Blocked waiting for GDB attach (pid = %d)’ % (os.getpid(),)
#raw_input(’Press Enter to continue: ’)
main()
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Appendix C: Summary Data Tables
C.1 Line of Sight Scenario
C.1.1 RZUSBSTICK.
Table C.1 summarizes the data for the line of sight portion of the experiment when
using the RZUSBSTICK.
Table C.1: Summary of Line of Sight Experiment using the RZUSBSTICK
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Number of
Successes
Mean
Probability of Success
Number of
Power Samples
Mean RSSI
Mean Power
(dbm)
20 m 60 60 100% 60 3.8833 -79.3500
40 m 60 60 100% 60 3.1333 -81.6000
60 m 90 60 66.6667% 80 1.1125 -87.6625
65 m 30 14 46.6667% 30 0.1333 -90.6000
70 m 30 23 76.6667% 30 0.1667 -90.5000
80 m 90 31 34.4444% 60 0.2833 -90.1500
100 m 60 16 26.6667% 29 0.1034 -90.6897
110 m 60 0 0% 11 0 -91
120 m 60 0 0% 2 0 -91
130 m 60 0 0% 0 NA NA
140 m 30 0 0% 0 NA NA
150 m 30 0 0% 0 NA NA
Table C.2 shows the statistics for the probability of success of the replay attack when
using the RZUSBSTICK. Table C.3 shows the statistics of the power of the replay attack
when using the RZUSBSTICK as measured by the sensor near the victim.
C.1.2 Omnidirectional Antenna.
Table C.4 summarizes the data for the line of sight experiment when using the USRP
with omnidirectional antenna and 30 db transmit gain. Table C.5 summarizes the data for
the line of sight experiment when using the USRP with omnidirectional antenna and 15 db
transmit gain. Table C.6 summarizes the data for the line of sight experiment when using
the USRP with omnidirectional antenna and 3 db transmit gain.
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Table C.2: Probability of Success Statistics during the Line of Sight Experiment using the
RZUSBSTICK
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Mean
Probability of Success
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
20 m 60 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
40 m 60 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
60 m 90 0.6667 0.4740 0.0500 (0.5351, 0.7982)
65 m 30 0.4667 0.5074 0.0926 (0.2113, 0.7220)
70 m 30 0.7667 0.4302 0.0785 (0.5502, 0.9832)
80 m 90 0.3444 0.4778 0.0504 (0.2119, 0.4770)
100 m 60 0.2667 0.4459 0.0576 (0.1134, 0.4199)
110 m 60 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
120 m 60 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
130 m 60 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
140 m 30 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
150 m 30 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
Table C.3: Power Statistics during the Line of Sight Experiment using the RZUSBSTICK
Distance
Number of
Power Samples
Mean Power
(dbm)
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
20 m 60 -79.3500 1.9985 0.2580 (-80.0368, -78.6632)
40 m 60 -81.6000 2.7321 0.3527 (-82.5388, -80.6612)
60 m 80 -87.6625 2.8237 0.3157 (-88.4958, -86.8292)
65 m 30 -90.6000 1.3025 0.2378 (-91.2555, -89.9445)
70 m 30 -90.5000 1.1371 0.2076 (-91.0723, -89.9277)
80 m 60 -90.1500 1.3633 0.1760 (-90.6185, -89.6815)
100 m 29 -90.6897 0.9298 0.1727 (-91.1668, -90.2126)
110 m 11 -91.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (-91.0000, -91.0000)
120 m 2 -91.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (-91.0000, -91.0000)
130 m 0 NA NA NA (NA, NA)
140 m 0 NA NA NA (NA, NA)
150 m 0 NA NA NA (NA, NA)
Table C.4: Summary of Line of Sight Experiment using the USRP with Omnidirectional
Antenna and 30 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Number of
Successes
Mean
Probability of Success
Number of
Power Samples
Mean RSSI
Mean Power
(dbm)
20 m 60 0 0% 60 12.2667 -54.2
40 m 60 0 0% 60 9.85 -61.45
60 m 60 31 51.67% 60 8.5667 -65.3
65 m 30 30 100% 30 7.3667 -68.9
70 m 30 30 100% 30 7.9667 -67.1
80 m 60 60 100% 60 7.2333 -69.3
100 m 60 60 100% 59 5.5423 -74.373
110 m 60 60 100% 35 4.9713 -76.086
120 m 60 38 63.33% 22 3.2273 -81.318
130 m 60 60 100% 54 5.111 -75.667
140 m 30 30 100% 6 3.5 -80.5
150 m 60 59 98.33% 34 4.147 -78.559
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Table C.5: Summary of Line of Sight Experiment using USRP with Omnidirectional
Antenna and 15 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Number of
Successes
Mean
Probability of Success
Number of
Power Samples
Mean RSSI
Mean Power
(dbm)
20 m 60 59 98.333% 60 6.9833 -70.05
40 m 60 60 100% 60 5.2167 -75.35
60 m 90 90 100% 60 3.8667 -79.4
65 m 30 30 100% 30 3 -82
70 m 30 30 100% 30 3.8 -79.6
80 m 90 90 100% 60 2.533 -83.4
100 m 60 56 93.333% 52 0.75 -88.75
110 m 60 57 96.667% 12 0.5833 -89.25
120 m 60 28 46.667% 5 0.2 -90.4
130 m 60 50 83.333% 22 1.3183 -87.045
140 m 30 20 66.667% 0 NA NA
150 m 60 25 41.667% 13 0.077 -90.769
Table C.6: Summary of Line of Sight Experiment using USRP with Omnidirectional
Antenna and 3 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Number of
Successes
Mean
Probability of Success
Number of
Power Samples
Mean RSSI
Mean Power
(dbm)
20 m 60 60 100% 60 3.85 -79.45
40 m 60 60 100% 60 2.2833 -84.15
60 m 90 87 96.667% 43 1.3953 -86.814
65 m 30 30 100% 15 0.2667 -90.2
70 m 30 29 96.667% 30 0.6667 -89.0
80 m 90 78 86.667% 35 0.457 -89.629
100 m 60 28 46.667% 0 NA NA
110 m 60 5 8.333% 0 NA NA
120 m 60 8 13.333% 0 NA NA
130 m 60 4 6.667% 0 NA NA
140 m 30 0 0% 0 NA NA
150 m 60 4 6.667% 0 NA NA
Table C.7 displays the probability of success statistics for the USRP with
omnidirectional antenna with 30 db transmit gain. Table C.8 shows the probability of
success statistics for the USRP with omnidirectional antenna with 15 db transmit gain.
Table C.9 details the probability of success statistics for the USRP with omnidirectional
antenna with 3 db transmit gain.
Table C.10 shows the statistics of the power of the replay attack when using the
USRP with omnidirectional antenna and 30 db transmit gain as measured by the sensor
near the victim. Table C.11 shows the statistics of the power of the replay attack when
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Table C.7: Probability of Success Statistics during the Line of Sight Experiment using the
USRP with Omnidirectional Antenna and 30 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Mean
Probability of Success
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
20 m 60 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
40 m 60 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
60 m 60 0.5167 0.5039 0.0651 (0.3435, 0.6898)
65 m 30 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
70 m 30 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
80 m 60 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
100 m 60 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
110 m 60 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
120 m 60 0.6333 0.4860 0.0627 (0.4663, 0.8003)
130 m 60 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
140 m 30 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
150 m 60 0.9833 0.1291 0.0167 (0.9390, 1.0277)
Table C.8: Probability of Success Statistics during the Line of Sight Experiment using the
USRP with Omnidirectional Antenna and 15 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Mean
Probability of Success
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
20 m 60 0.9833 0.1291 0.0167 (0.9390, 1.0277)
40 m 60 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
60 m 60 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
65 m 30 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
70 m 30 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
80 m 60 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
100 m 60 0.9333 0.2515 0.0325 (0.8469, 1.0198)
110 m 60 0.9667 0.1810 0.0234 (0.9045, 1.0289)
120 m 60 0.4667 0.5031 0.0649 (0.2938, 0.6395)
130 m 60 0.8333 0.3758 0.0485 (0.7042, 0.9625)
140 m 30 0.6667 0.4795 0.0875 (0.4254, 0.9080)
150 m 60 0.4167 0.4972 0.0642 (0.2458, 0.5875)
using the USRP with omnidirectional antenna and 15 db transmit gain as measured by the
sensor near the victim. Table C.12 shows the statistics of the power of the replay attack
when using the USRP with omnidirectional antenna and 3 db transmit gain as measured
by the sensor near the victim.
C.1.3 Directed Antenna.
Table C.13 summarizes the data for the line of sight experiment when using the
USRP with directed antenna and 30 db transmit gain. Table C.14 summarizes the data for
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Table C.9: Probability of Success Statistics during the Line of Sight Experiment using the
USRP with Omnidirectional Antenna and 3 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Mean
Probability of Success
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
20 m 60 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
40 m 60 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
60 m 60 0.9667 0.1810 0.0234 (0.9045, 1.0289)
65 m 30 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
70 m 30 0.9667 0.1826 0.0333 (0.8748, 1.0585)
80 m 60 0.8667 0.3428 0.0443 (0.7489, 0.9845)
100 m 60 0.4667 0.5031 0.0649 (0.2938, 0.6395)
110 m 60 0.0833 0.2787 0.0360 (-0.0124, 0.1791)
120 m 60 0.1333 0.3428 0.0443 (0.0155, 0.2511)
130 m 60 0.0667 0.2515 0.0325 (-0.0198, 0.1531)
140 m 30 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
150 m 60 0.0667 0.2515 0.0325 (-0.0198, 0.1531)
Table C.10: Power Statistics during the Line of Sight Experiment using the USRP with
Omnidirectional Antenna and 30 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number of
Power Samples
Mean Power
(dbm)
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
20 m 60 -54.2000 1.5492 0.2000 (-54.7324, -53.6676)
40 m 60 -61.4500 1.7313 0.2235 (-62.0449, -60.8551)
60 m 60 -65.3000 4.7311 0.6108 (-66.9257, -63.6743)
65 m 30 -68.9000 1.4704 0.2685 (-69.6400, -68.1600)
70 m 30 -67.1000 1.2415 0.2267 (-67.7248, -66.4752)
80 m 60 -69.3000 1.8622 0.2404 (-69.9399, -68.6601)
100 m 59 -74.3729 2.2507 0.2930 (-75.1533, -73.5925)
110 m 35 -76.0857 1.7042 0.2881 (-76.8716, -75.2998)
120 m 22 -81.3182 1.2868 0.2743 (-82.0950, -80.5414)
130 m 54 -75.6667 2.5179 0.3426 (-76.5821, -74.7512)
140 m 6 -80.5000 2.5100 1.0247 (-84.6317, -76.3683)
150 m 34 -78.5588 2.1061 0.3612 (-79.5461, -77.5716)
the line of sight experiment when using the USRP with directed antenna and 15 db
transmit gain. Table C.15 summarizes the data for the line of sight experiment when using
the USRP with directed antenna and 3 db transmit gain.
Table C.16 displays the probability of success statistics for the USRP with directed
antenna with 30 db transmit gain. Table C.17 shows the probability of success statistics
for the USRP with directed antenna with 15 db transmit gain. Table C.18 details the
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Table C.11: Power Statistics during the Line of Sight Experiment using the USRP with
Omnidirectional Antenna and 15 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number of
Power Samples
Mean Power
(dbm)
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
20 m 60 -70.0500 1.7891 0.2310 (-70.6648, -69.4352)
40 m 60 -75.3500 2.0734 0.2677 (-76.0625, -74.6375)
60 m 60 -79.4000 4.0388 0.5214 (-80.7879, -78.0121)
65 m 30 -82.0000 1.9298 0.3523 (-82.9712, -81.0288)
70 m 30 -79.6000 1.2205 0.2228 (-80.2142, -78.9858)
80 m 60 -83.4000 2.8416 0.3668 (-84.3765, -82.4235)
100 m 52 -88.7500 2.5117 0.3483 (-89.6820, -87.8180)
110 m 12 -89.2500 1.5448 0.4459 (-90.6350, -87.8650)
120 m 5 -90.4000 1.3416 0.6000 (-93.1625, -87.6375)
130 m 22 -87.0455 1.7037 0.3632 (-88.0739, -86.0170)
140 m 0 NA NA NA (NA, NA)
150 m 13 -90.7692 0.8321 0.2308 (-91.4741, -90.0643)
Table C.12: Power Statistics during the Line of Sight Experiment using the USRP with
Omnidirectional Antenna and 3 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number of
Power Samples
Mean Power
(dbm)
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
20 m 60 -79.4500 1.4430 0.1863 (-79.9459, -78.9541)
40 m 60 -84.1500 2.1457 0.2770 (-84.8873, -83.4127)
60 m 43 -86.8140 2.7882 0.4252 (-87.9612, -85.6667)
65 m 15 -90.2000 1.7809 0.4598 (-91.5688, -88.8312)
70 m 30 -89.0000 1.9827 0.3620 (-89.9978, -88.0022)
80 m 35 -89.6286 1.6818 0.2843 (-90.4042, -88.8529)
100 m 0 NA NA NA (NA, NA)
110 m 0 NA NA NA (NA, NA)
120 m 0 NA NA NA (NA, NA)
130 m 0 NA NA NA (NA, NA)
140 m 0 NA NA NA (NA, NA)
150 m 0 NA NA NA (NA, NA)
probability of success statistics for the USRP with directed antenna with 3 db transmit
gain.
Table C.19 displays the power statistics for the USRP with directed antenna with 30
db transmit gain. Table C.20 shows the power statistics for the USRP with directed
antenna with 15 db transmit gain. Table C.21 details the power statistics for the USRP
with directed antenna with 3 db transmit gain.
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Table C.13: Summary of Line of Sight Experiment using USRP with Directed Antenna and
30 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Number of
Successes
Mean
Probability of Success
Number of
Power Samples
Mean RSSI
Mean Power
(dbm)
20 m 60 1 1.667% 60 13.0833 -51.75
40 m 60 30 50% 60 11.1167 -57.65
60 m 60 37 61.667% 60 9.1167 -63.65
65 m 30 30 100% 30 8.5 -65.5
70 m 30 30 100% 30 8.2 -66.4
80 m 60 60 100% 60 7.9667 -67.1
100 m 60 60 100% 60 6.9167 -70.25
110 m 60 59 98.333% 60 5.5167 -74.45
120 m 60 60 100% 59 4.712 -76.864
130 m 60 60 100% 54 4.7963 -76.611
140 m 60 59 98.333% 58 4.5 -77.5
150 m 60 58 96.667% 55 4.2183 -78.345
Table C.14: Summary of Line of Sight Experiment using USRP with Directed Antenna and
15 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Number of
Successes
Mean
Probability of Success
Number of
Power Samples
Mean RSSI
Mean Power
(dbm)
20 m 60 60 100% 60 7.9167 -67.25
40 m 60 60 100% 60 6.25 -72.25
60 m 60 60 100% 60 4.9667 -76.1
65 m 30 30 100% 30 3.9667 -79.1
70 m 30 23 70% 30 3.9333 -79.2
80 m 60 56 93.333% 60 3.6333 -80.1
100 m 60 60 100% 60 2.2167 -84.35
110 m 60 52 86.667% 57 0.8597 -88.421
120 m 60 52 86.667% 54 0.4443 -89.667
130 m 60 59 98.333% 43 0.558 -89.326
140 m 60 55 91.667% 40 0.3 -90.1
150 m 60 33 55% 26 0.2693 -90.192
Table C.15: Summary of Line of Sight Experiment using USRP with Directed Antenna and
3 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Number of
Successes
Mean
Probability of Success
Number of
Power Samples
Mean RSSI
Mean Power
(dbm)
20 m 60 60 100% 60 4.5167 -77.45
40 m 60 60 100% 60 3.1333 -81.6
60 m 60 60 100% 60 1.9333 -85.2
65 m 30 25 83.333% 30 0.9 -88.3
70 m 30 1 3.333% 30 0.6667 -89
80 m 60 34 56.667% 56 0.6787 -88.964
100 m 60 24 40% 40 0.025 -90.925
110 m 60 5 8.333% 0 NA NA
120 m 60 3 5% 0 NA NA
130 m 60 0 0% 0 NA NA
140 m 60 0 0% 0 NA NA
150 m 60 0 0% 0 NA NA
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Table C.16: Probability of Success Statistics during the Line of Sight Experiment using the
USRP with Directed Antenna and 30 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Mean
Probability of Success
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
20 m 60 0.0167 0.1291 0.0167 (-0.0277, 0.0610)
40 m 60 0.5000 0.5042 0.0651 (0.3267, 0.6733)
60 m 60 0.6167 0.4903 0.0633 (0.4482, 0.7851)
65 m 30 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
70 m 30 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
80 m 60 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
100 m 60 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
110 m 60 0.9833 0.1291 0.0167 (0.9390, 1.0277)
120 m 60 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
130 m 60 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
140 m 60 0.9833 0.1291 0.0167 (0.9390, 1.0277)
150 m 60 0.9667 0.1810 0.0234 (0.9045, 1.0289)
Table C.17: Probability of Success Statistics during the Line of Sight Experiment using the
USRP with Directed Antenna and 15 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Mean
Probability of Success
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
20 m 60 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
40 m 60 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
60 m 60 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
65 m 30 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
70 m 30 0.7000 0.4661 0.0851 (0.4654, 0.9346)
80 m 60 0.9333 0.2515 0.0325 (0.8469, 1.0198)
100 m 60 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
110 m 60 0.8667 0.3428 0.0443 (0.7489, 0.9845)
120 m 60 0.8667 0.3428 0.0443 (0.7489, 0.9845)
130 m 60 0.9833 0.1291 0.0167 (0.9390, 1.0277)
140 m 60 0.9167 0.2787 0.0360 (0.8209, 1.0124)
150 m 60 0.5500 0.5017 0.0648 (0.3776, 0.7224)
Table C.18: Probability of Success Statistics during the Line of Sight Experiment using the
USRP with Directed Antenna and 3 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Mean
Probability of Success
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
20 m 60 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
40 m 60 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
60 m 60 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
65 m 30 0.8333 0.3790 0.0692 (0.6426, 1.0241)
70 m 30 0.0333 0.1826 0.0333 (-0.0585, 0.1252)
80 m 60 0.5667 0.4997 0.0645 (0.3949, 0.7384)
100 m 60 0.4000 0.4940 0.0638 (0.2302, 0.5698)
110 m 60 0.0833 0.2787 0.0360 (-0.0124, 0.1791)
120 m 60 0.0500 0.2198 0.0284 (-0.0255, 0.1255)
130 m 60 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
140 m 60 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
150 m 60 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
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Table C.19: Power Statistics during the Line of Sight Experiment using the USRP with
Directed Antenna and 30 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number of
Power Samples
Mean Power
(dbm)
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
20 m 60 -51.7500 1.0021 0.1294 (-52.0944, -51.4056)
40 m 60 -57.6500 1.9207 0.2480 (-58.3100, -56.9900)
60 m 60 -63.6500 1.8395 0.2375 (-64.2821, -63.0179)
65 m 30 -65.5000 1.8892 0.3449 (-66.4507, -64.5493)
70 m 30 -66.4000 1.2205 0.2228 (-67.0142, -65.7858)
80 m 60 -67.1000 2.2751 0.2937 (-67.8818, -66.3182)
100 m 60 -70.2500 2.1599 0.2788 (-70.9922, -69.5078)
110 m 60 -74.4500 2.2431 0.2896 (-75.2208, -73.6792)
120 m 59 -76.8644 2.4945 0.3248 (-77.7293, -75.9995)
130 m 54 -76.6111 1.8775 0.2555 (-77.2938, -75.9285)
140 m 58 -77.5000 1.8848 0.2475 (-78.1595, -76.8405)
150 m 55 -78.3455 1.7020 0.2295 (-78.9582, -77.7327)
Table C.20: Power Statistics during the Line of Sight Experiment using the USRP with
Directed Antenna and 15 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number of
Power Samples
Mean Power
(dbm)
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
20 m 60 -67.2500 1.0021 0.1294 (-67.5944, -66.9056)
40 m 60 -72.2500 1.8832 0.2431 (-72.8971, -71.6029)
60 m 60 -76.1000 1.7438 0.2251 (-76.6992, -75.5008)
65 m 30 -79.1000 0.9595 0.1752 (-79.5829, -78.6171)
70 m 30 -79.2000 1.0954 0.2000 (-79.7513, -78.6487)
80 m 60 -80.1000 2.3412 0.3023 (-80.9045, -79.2955)
100 m 60 -84.3500 2.5961 0.3352 (-85.2421, -83.4579)
110 m 57 -88.4211 2.2987 0.3045 (-89.2329, -87.6092)
120 m 54 -89.6667 1.6136 0.2196 (-90.2534, -89.0800)
130 m 43 -89.3256 2.2962 0.3502 (-90.2703, -88.3808)
140 m 40 -90.1000 1.3923 0.2201 (-90.6961, -89.5039)
150 m 26 -90.1923 1.3570 0.2661 (-90.9341, -89.4505)
Table C.21: Power Statistics during the Line of Sight Experiment using the USRP with
Directed Antenna and 3 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number of
Power Samples
Mean Power
(dbm)
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
20 m 60 -77.4500 1.7017 0.2197 (-78.0348, -76.8652)
40 m 60 -81.6000 1.7870 0.2307 (-82.2141, -80.9859)
60 m 60 -85.2000 2.0568 0.2655 (-85.9068, -84.4932)
65 m 30 -88.3000 1.6432 0.3000 (-89.1269, -87.4731)
70 m 30 -89.0000 1.4384 0.2626 (-89.7239, -88.2761)
80 m 56 -88.9643 1.9906 0.2660 (-89.6740, -88.2545)
100 m 40 -90.9250 0.4743 0.0750 (-91.1281, -90.7219)
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C.2 Blocked Line of Sight Scenario
C.2.1 RZUSBSTICK.
Table C.22 summarizes the data for the blocked line of sight portion of the
experiment when using the RZUSBSTICK.
Table C.22: Summary of Blocked Line of Sight Experiment using the RZUSBSTICK
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Number of
Successes
Mean
Probability of Success
Number of
Power Samples
Mean RSSI
Mean Power
(dbm)
15 m 30 30 100% 30 0 -91
20 m 30 30 100% 11 0 -91
25 m 30 0 0% 30 0 -91
30 m 30 0 0% 0 NA NA
35 m 30 0 0% 0 NA NA
Table C.23 shows the statistics for the probability of success of the replay attack
when using the RZUSBSTICK. Table C.24 shows the statistics of the power of the replay
attack when using the RZUSBSTICK as measured by the sensor near the victim.
Table C.23: Probability of Success Statistics during the Blocked Line of Sight Experiment
using the RZUSBSTICK
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Mean
Probability of Success
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 30 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
20 m 30 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
25 m 30 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
30 m 30 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
35 m 30 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
Table C.24: Power Statistics during the Blocked Line of Sight Experiment using the
RZUSBSTICK
Distance
Number of
Power Samples
Mean Power
(dbm)
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 30 -91.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (-91.0000, -91.0000)
20 m 11 -91.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (-91.0000, -91.0000)
25 m 30 -91.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (-91.0000, -91.0000)
30 m 0 NA NA NA (NA, NA)
35 m 0 NA NA NA (NA, NA)
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C.2.2 Omnidirectional Antenna.
Table C.25 summarizes the data for the blocked line of sight experiment when using
the USRP with omnidirectional antenna and 30 db transmit gain. Table C.26 summarizes
the data for the blocked line of sight experiment when using the USRP with
omnidirectional antenna and 15 db transmit gain. Table C.27 summarizes the data for the
blocked line of sight experiment when using the USRP with omnidirectional antenna and
3 db transmit gain.
Table C.25: Summary of Blocked Line of Sight Experiment using the USRP with
Omnidirectional Antenna and 30 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Number of
Successes
Mean
Probability of Success
Number of
Power Samples
Mean RSSI
Mean Power
(dbm)
15 m 30 30 100% 30 9 -64
20 m 30 30 100% 30 8.0667 -66.8
25 m 30 30 100% 30 7 -70
30 m 30 30 100% 25 0.92 -88.24
35 m 30 30 100% 29 3.8966 -79.3103
Table C.26: Summary of Blocked Line of Sight Experiment using the USRP with
Omnidirectional Antenna and 15 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Number of
Successes
Mean
Probability of Success
Number of
Power Samples
Mean RSSI
Mean Power
(dbm)
15 m 30 28 93.33% 30 4.6667 -77
20 m 30 30 100% 30 3.0333 -81.9
25 m 30 29 96.67% 30 1.4667 -86.6
30 m 30 24 80% 23 0 -91
35 m 30 8 26.67% 23 0 -91
Table C.27: Summary of Blocked Line of Sight Experiment using the USRP with
Omnidirectional Antenna and 3 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Number of
Successes
Mean
Probability of Success
Number of
Power Samples
Mean RSSI
Mean Power
(dbm)
15 m 30 20 66.67% 30 1.5 -86.5
20 m 30 0 0% 0 NA NA
25 m 30 0 0% 0 NA NA
30 m 30 0 0% 0 NA NA
35 m 30 0 0% 0 NA NA
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Table C.28 displays the probability of success statistics for the USRP with
omnidirectional antenna with 30 db transmit gain. Table C.29 shows the probability of
success statistics for the USRP with omnidirectional antenna with 15 db transmit gain.
Table C.30 details the probability of success statistics for the USRP with omnidirectional
antenna with 3 db transmit gain.
Table C.28: Probability of Success Statistics during the Blocked Line of Sight Experiment
using the USRP with Omnidirectional Antenna and 30 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Mean
Probability of Success
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 30 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
20 m 30 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
25 m 30 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
30 m 30 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
35 m 30 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
Table C.29: Probability of Success Statistics during the Blocked Line of Sight Experiment
using the USRP with Omnidirectional Antenna and 15 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Mean
Probability of Success
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 30 0.9333 0.2537 0.0463 (0.8057, 1.0610)
20 m 30 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
25 m 30 0.9667 0.1826 0.0333 (0.8748, 1.0585)
30 m 30 0.8000 0.4068 0.0743 (0.5953, 1.0047)
35 m 30 0.2667 0.4498 0.0821 (0.0403, 0.4930)
Table C.30: Probability of Success Statistics during the Blocked Line of Sight Experiment
using the USRP with Omnidirectional Antenna and 3 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Mean
Probability of Success
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 30 0.6667 0.4795 0.0875 (0.4254, 0.9080)
20 m 30 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
25 m 30 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
30 m 30 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
35 m 30 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
Table C.31 shows the statistics of the power of the replay attack when using the
USRP with omnidirectional antenna and 30 db transmit gain as measured by the sensor
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near the victim. Table C.32 shows the statistics of the power of the replay attack when
using the USRP with omnidirectional antenna and 15 db transmit gain as measured by the
sensor near the victim. Table C.33 shows the statistics of the power of the replay attack
when using the USRP with omnidirectional antenna and 3 db transmit gain as measured
by the sensor near the victim.
Table C.31: Power Statistics during the Blocked Line of Sight Experiment using the USRP
with Omnidirectional Antenna and 30 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number of
Power Samples
Mean Power
(dbm)
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 30 -64.0000 1.3646 0.2491 (-64.6867, -63.3133)
20 m 30 -66.8000 2.6050 0.4756 (-68.1110, -65.4890)
25 m 30 -70.0000 0.7878 0.1438 (-70.3965, -69.6035)
30 m 25 -88.2400 2.8618 0.5724 (-89.8409, -86.6391)
35 m 29 -79.3103 1.4664 0.2723 (-80.0628, -78.5579)
Table C.32: Power Statistics during the Blocked Line of Sight Experiment using the USRP
with Omnidirectional Antenna and 15 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number of
Power Samples
Mean Power
(dbm)
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 30 -77.0000 1.4384 0.2626 (-77.7239, -76.2761)
20 m 30 -81.9000 2.4262 0.4430 (-83.1209, -80.6791)
25 m 30 -86.6000 1.8864 0.3444 (-87.5493, -85.6507)
30 m 23 -91.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (-91.0000, -91.0000)
35 m 23 -91.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (-91.0000, -91.0000)
Table C.33: Power Statistics during the Blocked Line of Sight Experiment using the USRP
with Omnidirectional Antenna and 3 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number of
Power Samples
Mean Power
(dbm)
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 30 -86.5000 1.8892 0.3449 (-87.4507, -85.5493)
20 m 0 NA NA NA (NA, NA)
25 m 0 NA NA NA (NA, NA)
30 m 0 NA NA NA (NA, NA)
35 m 0 NA NA NA (NA, NA)
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C.2.3 Directed Antenna.
Table C.34 summarizes the data for the blocked line of sight experiment when using
the USRP with directed antenna and 30 db transmit gain. Table C.35 summarizes the data
for the blocked line of sight experiment when using the USRP with directed antenna and
15 db transmit gain. Table C.36 summarizes the data for the blocked line of sight
experiment when using the USRP with directed antenna and 3 db transmit gain.
Table C.34: Summary of Blocked Line of Sight Experiment using the USRP with Directed
Antenna and 30 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Number of
Successes
Mean
Probability of Success
Number of
Power Samples
Mean RSSI
Mean Power
(dbm)
15 m 30 29 96.67% 30 9.8 -61.6
20 m 30 30 100% 30 9.6 -62.2
25 m 30 30 100% 30 7.1 -69.7
30 m 30 30 100% 30 5.3 -75.1
35 m 30 30 100% 30 3.6333 -80.1
Table C.35: Summary of Blocked Line of Sight Experiment using the USRP with Directed
Antenna and 15 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Number of
Successes
Mean
Probability of Success
Number of
Power Samples
Mean RSSI
Mean Power
(dbm)
15 m 30 30 100% 30 4.9667 -76.1
20 m 30 30 100% 30 5 -76
25 m 30 30 100% 30 1.7667 -85.7
30 m 30 30 100% 23 0 -91
35 m 30 4 13.33% 23 0 -91
Table C.36: Summary of Blocked Line of Sight Experiment using the USRP with Directed
Antenna and 3 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Number of
Successes
Mean
Probability of Success
Number of
Power Samples
Mean RSSI
Mean Power
(dbm)
15 m 30 30 100% 30 1.3 -87.1
20 m 30 30 100% 30 1.1667 -87.5
25 m 30 16 53.33% 23 0 -91
30 m 30 0 0% 0 NA NA
35 m 30 0 0% 0 NA NA
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Table C.37 displays the probability of success statistics for the USRP with directed
antenna with 30 db transmit gain. Table C.38 shows the probability of success statistics
for the USRP with directed antenna with 15 db transmit gain. Table C.39 details the
probability of success statistics for the USRP with directed antenna with 3 db transmit
gain.
Table C.37: Probability of Success Statistics during the Blocked Line of Sight Experiment
using the USRP with Directed Antenna and 30 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Mean
Probability of Success
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 30 0.9667 0.1826 0.0333 (0.8748, 1.0585)
20 m 30 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
25 m 30 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
30 m 30 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
35 m 30 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
Table C.38: Probability of Success Statistics during the Blocked Line of Sight Experiment
using the USRP with Directed Antenna and 15 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Mean
Probability of Success
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 30 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
20 m 30 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
25 m 30 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
30 m 30 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
35 m 30 0.1333 0.3457 0.0631 (-0.0407, 0.3073)
Table C.39: Probability of Success Statistics during the Blocked Line of Sight Experiment
using the USRP with Directed Antenna and 3 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Mean
Probability of Success
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 30 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
20 m 30 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
25 m 30 0.5333 0.5074 0.0926 (0.2780, 0.7887)
30 m 30 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
35 m 30 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
Table C.40 displays the power statistics for the USRP with directed antenna with 30
db transmit gain. Table C.41 shows the power statistics for the USRP with directed
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antenna with 15 db transmit gain. Table C.42 details the power statistics for the USRP
with directed antenna with 3 db transmit gain.
Table C.40: Power Statistics during the Blocked Line of Sight Experiment using theUSRP
with Directed Antenna and 30 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number of
Power Samples
Mean Power
(dbm)
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 30 -61.6000 1.2205 0.2228 (-62.2142, -60.9858)
20 m 30 -62.2000 1.6897 0.3085 (-63.0503, -61.3497)
25 m 30 -69.7000 1.4420 0.2633 (-70.4257, -68.9743)
30 m 30 -75.1000 1.3983 0.2553 (-75.8037, -74.3963)
35 m 30 -80.1000 1.6682 0.3046 (-80.9395, -79.2605)
Table C.41: Power Statistics during the Blocked Line of Sight Experiment using the USRP
with Directed Antenna and 15 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number of
Power Samples
Mean Power
(dbm)
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 30 -76.1000 1.2415 0.2267 (-76.7248, -75.4752)
20 m 30 -76.0000 1.3646 0.2491 (-76.6867, -75.3133)
25 m 30 -85.7000 2.1838 0.3987 (-86.7990, -84.6010)
30 m 24 -91.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (-91.0000, -91.0000)
35 m 25 -91.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (-91.0000, -91.0000)
Table C.42: Power Statistics during the Blocked Line of Sight Experiment using the USRP
with Directed Antenna and 3 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number of
Power Samples
Mean Power
(dbm)
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 30 -87.1000 2.2491 0.4106 (-88.2319 -85.9681)
20 m 30 -87.5000 1.3834 0.2526 (-88.1962 -86.8038)
25 m 23 -91.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (-91.0000 -91.0000)
30 m 0 NA NA NA (NA, NA)
35 m 0 NA NA NA (NA, NA)
C.3 GNU Radio Scenario
C.3.1 RZUSBSTICK.
Table C.43 summarizes the data for the GNU Radio portion of the experiment when
using the RZUSBSTICK.
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Table C.43: Summary of GNU Radio Blocked Line of Sight Experiment using the
RZUSBSTICK
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Number of
Successes
Mean
Probability of Success
Number of
Power Samples
Mean RSSI
Mean Power
(dbm)
15 m 100 99 99% 100 0.01 -90.97
20 m 100 17 17% 41 0 -91
25 m 100 5 5% 0 NA NA
30 m 100 0 0% 0 NA NA
35 m 100 0 0% 0 NA NA
Table C.44 shows the statistics for the probability of success of the replay attack
when using the RZUSBSTICK. Table C.45 shows the statistics of the power of the replay
attack when using the RZUSBSTICK as measured by the sensor near the victim.
Table C.46 shows the statistics for the probability of the sensor detecting the replay attack
from the RZUSBSTICK.
Table C.44: Probability of Success Statistics during the GNU Radio Blocked Line of Sight
Experiment using the RZUSBSTICK
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Mean
Probability of Success
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 100 0.9900 0.1000 0.0100 (0.9637, 1.0163)
20 m 100 0.1700 0.3775 0.0378 (0.0708, 0.2692)
25 m 100 0.0500 0.2190 0.0219 (-0.0075, 0.1075)
30 m 100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
35 m 100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
Table C.45: Power Statistics during the GNU Radio Blocked Line of Sight Experiment
using the RZUSBSTICK
Distance
Number of
Power Samples
Mean Power
(dbm)
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 100 -90.9700 0.3000 0.0300 (-91.0488, -90.8912)
20 m 41 -91.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (-91.0000, -91.0000)
25 m 0 NA NA NA (NA, NA)
30 m 0 NA NA NA (NA, NA)
35 m 0 NA NA NA (NA, NA)
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Table C.46: Probability of Success of the Sensor Statistics during the GNU Radio Blocked
Line of Sight Experiment using the RZUSBSTICK
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Mean
Probability of Success
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 100 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
20 m 100 0.4100 0.4943 0.0494 (0.2802, 0.5398)
25 m 100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
30 m 100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
35 m 100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
C.3.2 Omnidirectional Antenna.
Table C.47 summarizes the data for the GNU Radio blocked line of sight experiment
when using the USRP with omnidirectional antenna and 20 db transmit gain. Table C.48
summarizes the data for the GNU Radio blocked line of sight experiment when using the
USRP with omnidirectional antenna and 15 db transmit gain. Table C.49 summarizes the
data for the GNU Radio blocked line of sight experiment when using the USRP with
omnidirectional antenna and 3 db transmit gain.
Table C.47: Summary of GNU Radio Blocked Line of Sight Experiment using the USRP
with Omnidirectional Antenna and 20 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Number of
Successes
Mean
Probability of Success
Number of
Power Samples
Mean RSSI
Mean Power
(dbm)
15 m 100 2 2% 98 7.9184 -67.2449
20 m 100 25 25% 97 4.3918 -77.8247
25 m 100 9 9% 54 3.2407 -81.2778
30 m 100 0 0% 100 3.2 -81.4
35 m 100 0 0% 97 1.1237 -87.6289
Table C.48: Summary of GNU Radio Blocked Line of Sight Experiment using the USRP
with Omnidirectional Antenna and 15 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Number of
Successes
Mean
Probability of Success
Number of
Power Samples
Mean RSSI
Mean Power
(dbm)
15 m 100 5 5% 100 6.78 -70.66
20 m 100 6 6% 96 3.0625 -81.8125
25 m 100 6 6% 62 2 -85
30 m 100 0 0% 98 2.1021 -84.6939
35 m 100 0 0% 22 0 -91
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Table C.49: Summary of GNU Radio Blocked Line of Sight Experiment using the USRP
with Omnidirectional Antenna and 3 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Number of
Successes
Mean
Probability of Success
Number of
Power Samples
Mean RSSI
Mean Power
(dbm)
15 m 100 71 71% 89 1.6966 -85.9101
20 m 100 0 0% 7 0.1429 -90.5714
25 m 100 0 0% 0 NA NA
30 m 100 0 0% 0 NA NA
35 m 100 0 0% 0 NA NA
Table C.50 displays the probability of success statistics for the USRP with
omnidirectional antenna with 20 db transmit gain. Table C.51 shows the probability of
success statistics for the USRP with omnidirectional antenna with 15 db transmit gain.
Table C.52 details the probability of success statistics for the USRP with omnidirectional
antenna with 3 db transmit gain.
Table C.50: Probability of Success Statistics during the GNU Radio Blocked Line of Sight
Experiment using the USRP with Omnidirectional Antenna and 20 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Mean
Probability of Success
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 100 0.0200 0.1407 0.0141 (-0.0170, 0.0570)
20 m 100 0.2500 0.4352 0.0435 (0.1357, 0.3643)
25 m 100 0.0900 0.2876 0.0288 (0.0145, 0.1655)
30 m 100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
35 m 100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
Table C.51: Probability of Success Statistics during the GNU Radio Blocked Line of Sight
Experiment using the USRP with Omnidirectional Antenna and 15 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Mean
Probability of Success
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 100 0.0500 0.2190 0.0219 (-0.0075, 0.1075)
20 m 100 0.0600 0.2387 0.0239 (-0.0027, 0.1227)
25 m 100 0.0600 0.2387 0.0239 (-0.0027, 0.1227)
30 m 100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
35 m 100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
Table C.53 displays the probability of success of the sensor statistics for the USRP
with omnidirectional antenna with 20 db transmit gain. Table C.54 shows the probability
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Table C.52: Probability of Success Statistics during the GNU Radio Blocked Line of Sight
Experiment using the USRP with Omnidirectional Antenna and 3 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Mean
Probability of Success
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 100 0.7100 0.4560 0.4560 (0.5902, 0.8298)
20 m 100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
25 m 100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
30 m 100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
35 m 100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
of success of the sensor statistics for the USRP with omnidirectional antenna with 15 db
transmit gain. Table C.55 details the probability of success of the sensor statistics for the
USRP with omnidirectional antenna with 3 db transmit gain.
Table C.53: Probability of Success of the Sensor Statistics during the GNU Radio Blocked
Line of Sight Experiment using the USRP with Omnidirectional Antenna and 20 db
Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Mean
Probability of Success
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 100 0.9800 0.1407 0.0141 (0.9430, 1.0170)
20 m 100 0.9700 0.1714 0.0171 (0.9250, 1.0150)
25 m 100 0.5400 0.5009 0.0501 (0.4084, 0.6716)
30 m 100 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
35 m 100 0.9700 0.1714 0.0171 (0.9250, 1.0150)
Table C.54: Probability of Success of the Sensor Statistics during the GNU Radio Blocked
Line of Sight Experiment using the USRP with Omnidirectional Antenna and 15 db
Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Mean
Probability of Success
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 100 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
20 m 100 0.9600 0.1969 0.0197 (0.9083, 1.0117)
25 m 100 0.6200 0.4878 0.0488 (0.4919, 0.7481)
30 m 100 0.9800 0.1407 0.0141 (0.9430, 1.0170)
35 m 100 0.2200 0.4163 0.0416 (0.1107, 0.3293)
Table C.56 shows the statistics of the received power of the replay attack when using
the USRP with omnidirectional antenna and 20 db transmit gain as measured by the
sensor near the victim. Table C.57 shows the statistics of the received power of the replay
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Table C.55: Probability of Success of the Sensor Statistics during the GNU Radio Blocked
Line of Sight Experiment using the USRP with Omnidirectional Antenna and 3 db Transmit
Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Mean
Probability of Success
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 100 0.8900 0.3145 0.0314 (0.8074, 0.9726)
20 m 100 0.0700 0.2564 0.0256 (0.0027, 0.1373)
25 m 100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
30 m 100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
35 m 100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
attack when using the USRP with omnidirectional antenna and 15 db transmit gain as
measured by the sensor near the victim. Table C.58 shows the statistics of the received
power of the replay attack when using the USRP with omnidirectional antenna and 3 db
transmit gain as measured by the sensor near the victim.
Table C.56: Power Statistics during the GNU Radio Blocked Line of Sight Experiment
using the USRP with Omnidirectional Antenna and 20 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number of
Power Samples
Mean Power
(dbm)
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 98 -67.2449 1.5929 0.1609 (-67.6677, -66.8221)
20 m 97 -77.8247 2.8904 0.2935 (-78.5960, -77.0535)
25 m 54 -81.2778 2.1755 0.2960 (-82.0688, -80.4868)
30 m 100 -81.4000 1.8091 0.1809 (-81.8751, -80.9249)
35 m 97 -87.6289 2.2189 0.2253 (-88.2209, -87.0368)
Table C.57: Power Statistics during the GNU Radio Blocked Line of Sight Experiment
using the USRP with Omnidirectional Antenna and 15 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number of
Power Samples
Mean Power
(dbm)
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 100 -70.6600 1.7362 0.1736 (-71.1160, -70.2040)
20 m 96 -81.8125 2.1241 0.2168 (-82.3824, -81.2426)
25 m 62 -85.0000 2.3047 0.2927 (-85.7782, -84.2218)
30 m 98 -84.6939 1.9018 0.1921 (-85.1986, -84.1891)
35 m 22 -91.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (-91.0000, -91.0000)
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Table C.58: Power Statistics during the GNU Radio Blocked Line of Sight Experiment
using the USRP with Omnidirectional Antenna and 3 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number of
Power Samples
Mean Power
(dbm)
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 89 -85.9101 2.1407 0.2269 (-86.5076, -85.3127)
20 m 7 -90.5714 1.1339 0.4286 (-92.1603, -88.9825)
25 m 0 NA NA NA (NA, NA)
30 m 0 NA NA NA (NA, NA)
35 m 0 NA NA NA (NA, NA)
C.3.3 Directed Antenna.
Table C.59 summarizes the data for the GNU Radio blocked line of sight experiment
when using the USRP with directed antenna and 20 db transmit gain. Table C.60
summarizes the data for the GNU Radio blocked line of sight experiment when using the
USRP with directed antenna and 15 db transmit gain. Table C.61 summarizes the data for
the GNU Radio blocked line of sight experiment when using the USRP with directed
antenna and 3 db transmit gain.
Table C.59: Summary of GNU Radio Blocked Line of Sight Experiment using the USRP
with Directed Antenna and 20 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Number of
Successes
Mean
Probability of Success
Number of
Power Samples
Mean RSSI
Mean Power
(dbm)
15 m 100 65 65% 99 6.7373 -70.7879
20 m 100 77 77% 100 3.8 -79.6
25 m 100 34 34% 97 3.7629 -79.7113
30 m 100 1 1% 94 1.5213 -86.4362
35 m 100 0 0% 72 0.3889 -89.8333
Table C.60: Summary of GNU Radio Blocked Line of Sight Experiment using the USRP
with Directed Antenna and 15 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Number of
Successes
Mean
Probability of Success
Number of
Power Samples
Mean RSSI
Mean Power
(dbm)
15 m 100 63 63% 98 4.5714 -77.2857
20 m 100 24 24% 38 2.3421 -83.9737
25 m 100 9 9% 95 2.2632 -84.2105
30 m 100 0 0% 80 0.425 -89.725
35 m 100 0 0% 27 0.037 -90.8889
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Table C.61: Summary of GNU Radio Blocked Line of Sight Experiment using the USRP
with Directed Antenna and 3 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Number of
Successes
Mean
Probability of Success
Number of
Power Samples
Mean RSSI
Mean Power
(dbm)
15 m 100 37 37% 97 2.4536 -83.6392
20 m 100 0 0% 0 NA NA
25 m 100 0 0% 0 NA NA
30 m 100 0 0% 0 NA NA
35 m 100 0 0% 0 NA NA
Table C.62 displays the probability of success statistics for the USRP with directed
antenna with 20 db transmit gain. Table C.63 shows the probability of success statistics
for the USRP with directed antenna with 15 db transmit gain. Table C.64 details the
probability of success statistics for the USRP with directed antenna with 3 db transmit
gain.
Table C.62: Probability of Success Statistics during the GNU Radio Blocked Line of Sight
Experiment using the USRP with Directed Antenna and 20 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Mean
Probability of Success
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 100 0.6500 0.4794 0.0479 (0.5241, 0.7759)
20 m 100 0.7700 0.4230 0.0423 (0.6589, 0.8811)
25 m 100 0.3400 0.4761 0.0476 (0.2150, 0.4650)
30 m 100 0.0100 0.1000 0.0100 (-0.0163, 0.0363)
35 m 100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
Table C.63: Probability of Success Statistics during the GNU Radio Blocked Line of Sight
Experiment using the USRP with Directed Antenna and 15 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Mean
Probability of Success
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 100 0.6300 0.4852 0.0485 (0.5026, 0.7574)
20 m 100 0.2400 0.4292 0.0429 (0.1273, 0.3527)
25 m 100 0.0900 0.2876 0.0288 (0.0145, 0.1655)
30 m 100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
35 m 100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
Table C.65 displays the probability of success of the sensor statistics for the USRP
with directed antenna with 20 db transmit gain. Table C.66 shows the probability of
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Table C.64: Probability of Success Statistics during the GNU Radio Blocked Line of Sight
Experiment using the USRP with Directed Antenna and 3 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Mean
Probability of Success
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 100 0.3700 0.4852 0.0485 (0.2426, 0.4974)
20 m 100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
25 m 100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
30 m 100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
35 m 100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
success of the sensor statistics for the USRP with directed antenna with 15 db transmit
gain. Table C.67 details the probability of success of the sensor statistics for the USRP
with directed antenna with 3 db transmit gain.
Table C.65: Probability of Success of the Sensor Statistics during the Blocked Line of Sight
Experiment using the USRP with Directed Antenna and 20 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Mean
Probability of Success
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 100 0.9900 0.1000 0.0100 (0.9637, 1.0163)
20 m 100 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1.0000, 1.0000)
25 m 100 0.9700 0.1714 0.0171 (0.9250, 1.0150)
30 m 100 0.9400 0.2387 0.0239 (0.8773, 1.0027)
35 m 100 0.7200 0.4513 0.0451 (0.6015, 0.8385)
Table C.66: Probability of Success of the Sensor Statistics during the GNU Radio Blocked
Line of Sight Experiment using the USRP with Directed Antenna and 15 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Mean
Probability of Success
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 100 0.9800 0.1407 0.0141 (0.9430, 1.0170)
20 m 100 0.3800 0.4878 0.0488 (0.2519, 0.5081)
25 m 100 0.9500 0.2190 0.0219 (0.8925, 1.0075)
30 m 100 0.8000 0.4020 0.0402 (0.6944, 0.9056)
35 m 100 0.2700 0.4462 0.0446 (0.1528, 0.3872)
Table C.68 shows the statistics of the received power of the replay attack when using
the USRP with directed antenna and 20 db transmit gain as measured by the sensor near
the victim. Table C.69 shows the statistics of the received power of the replay attack when
using the USRP with directed antenna and 15 db transmit gain as measured by the sensor
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Table C.67: Probability of Success of the Sensor Statistics during the GNU Radio Blocked
Line of Sight Experiment using the USRP with Directed Antenna and 3 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number
Of Trials
Mean
Probability of Success
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 100 0.9700 0.1714 0.0171 (0.9250, 1.0150)
20 m 100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
25 m 100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
30 m 100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
35 m 100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000, 0.0000)
near the victim. Table C.70 shows the statistics of the received power of the replay attack
when using the USRP with directed antenna and 3 db transmit gain as measured by the
sensor near the victim.
Table C.68: Power Statistics during the GNU Radio Blocked Line of Sight Experiment
using the USRP with Directed Antenna and 20 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number of
Power Samples
Mean Power
(dbm)
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 99 -70.7879 2.2098 0.2221 (-71.3713, -70.2045)
20 m 100 -79.6000 2.0449 0.2045 (-80.1371, -79.0629)
25 m 97 -79.7113 1.9736 0.2004 (-80.2380, -79.1847)
30 m 94 -86.4362 1.8524 0.1911 (-86.9386, -85.9337)
35 m 72 -89.8333 1.7116 0.2017 (-90.3672, -89.2994)
Table C.69: Power Statistics during the GNU Radio Blocked Line of Sight Experiment
using the USRP with Directed Antenna and 15 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number of
Power Samples
Mean Power
(dbm)
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 98 -77.2857 1.7761 0.1794 (-77.7571, -76.8143)
20 m 38 -83.9737 1.8814 0.3052 (-84.8025, -83.1449)
25 m 95 -84.2105 1.9673 0.2018 (-84.7412, -83.6799)
30 m 80 -89.7250 1.7061 0.1907 (-90.2285, -89.2215)
35 m 27 -90.8889 0.5774 0.1111 (-91.1976, -90.5801)
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Table C.70: Power Statistics during the GNU Radio Blocked Line of Sight Experiment
using the USRP with Directed Antenna and 3 db Transmit Gain
Distance
Number of
Power Samples
Mean Power
(dbm)
Standard Deviation Standard Error 99% Confidence Interval
15 m 97 -83.6392 2.0320 0.2063 (-84.1814, -83.0970)
20 m 0 NA NA NA (NA, NA)
25 m 0 NA NA NA (NA, NA)
30 m 0 NA NA NA (NA, NA)
35 m 0 NA NA NA (NA, NA)
112
Bibliography
[80211] IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks–Part 15.4:
Low-Rate Wireless Personal Area Networks (LR-WPANs). IEEE Std
802.15.4-2011 (Revision of IEEE Std 802.15.4-2006), pages 1–314, 2011.
[CWL10] Johnny Cache, Joshua Wright, and Vincent Liu. Hacking Wireless Exposed.
McGraw Hill, 2010.
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